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Corporate Deferred Prosecutions
Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing
Candace Zierdt' & Ellen S. Podgor
INTRODUCTION
D EFERRED prosecution agreements have become common in the corpo-
rate sphere.3 The corporation and government reach an agreement
which provides that a prosecutor will not immediately proceed with a crim-
inal action in return for the corporation agreeing to a set of terms laid out
in the agreement. 4 These terms range from providing a law school chair,'
to waiving the attorney client privilege,6 to determining the methodology
for whether the deferred prosecution contract has been breached.7 In some
cases, the agreements will provide for the firing of specific personnel or will
allow a monitor to retain oversight of the corporation.8
I Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. The author thanks the University
of North Dakota School of Law for its support of this project.
2 Associate Dean of Faculty Development & Distance Education & Professor of Law,
Stetson University College of Law.
The authors thank Dean Darby Dickerson and Stetson University College of Law for
their support of this project. The authors also thank Cheryl L. Segal and Professors Michael
Seigel, William Woodward and Peter Henning.
3 See generally CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF
DEFERRED AND NON PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2005), available at http://www.corporatecri-
mereporter.com/deferredreport.htm (discussing the rise in corporate deferred prosecution
agreements); Laurie P. Cohen, Executives on Trial: DeferredDeals Like Quattrone's Are on the Rise,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2006, at C I (same).
4 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1863-1872
(2005) (discussing a general overview of deferred prosecution agreements).
5 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and
the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey 6, § 20 (2005), available at
http:llwww.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf [hereinafter Bristol-Myers
Squipp Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (agreeing to "endow a chair at Seton Hall University
School of Law dedicated to the teaching of business ethics and corporate governance").
6 See infra notes 41-83 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement between the University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey and the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New
Jersey, at 3-4, § 11 (zoo5), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/
I
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In a post-Arthur Andersen world, corporations readily accept a deferred
prosecution agreement, no matter what the terms, as an alternative to a
corporate death sentence.9 Arthur Andersen, LLP's indictment and sub-
sequent prosecution devastated the company."° The later Supreme Court
decision that reversed the conviction" against the company was superflu-
ous in light of the collateral consequences already suffered as a result of the
government indictment."2 Thus, the innocence or guilt of the corporation
becomes irrelevant in a world of potential civil shareholder lawsuits and
devastating power wielded by the government.1 3 Companies are ready to
sign agreements to cooperate fully with the government,1 4 even to the ex-
tent of not providing executives with previously contracted attorney fees,
in order to obtain a deferred prosecution agreement that will allow the
company to continue operating as a business. 5
Absent from this deferred prosecution approach is a focused contract
theory. Although contracts have served a critical role in the interpretation
and enforcement of plea bargains, 6 deferred prosecution agreements have
UMDNJFINALDPA.pdf#search=%2zdeferred%2oprosecution%zo%zoUniversity%zoof%z
oMedicine%2oand%zoDentistry%zoof%2oNew%oJersey%2o%z2 [hereinafter University
of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey Deferred Prosecution Agreement].
9 See United States v. Stein I, 435 E Supp. 2d 330, 337 n. I (S.D.N.Y. 2oo6) (noting
that an amicus brief in the case had "point[ed] out that no major financial services firm has
ever survived a criminal indictment"); but see First Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, CR 05-587(A)-DDP (D.C. Cal. 2004), available at
http:l/awprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/milberg-weiss-indictment.pdf
(indicting a law firm).
io Prior to being indicted, Arthur Andersen, LLP was considered one of the "big-five"
accounting firms. The government indictment, followed by the conviction devastated the
company. See Linda Greenhouse, The Andersen Decision: The Overview; Justices Reject Auditor
Verdict in Enron Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at Ai (noting how the accounting firm
"shrunk from 28,000 employees in the United States to a skeleton crew of 200" who were
closing down the partnership).
11 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
12 Overturning the conviction is irrelevant as the collateral consequences of loss of busi-
ness devastates the company. See generally Postings on Arthur Andersen, White Collar Crime
Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrimeblog /arthur andersen/index.
html (last visited 9-2-06).
13 See Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Ray of Hope or Guilty Plea By Another
Name?, INSIDE LITIo., Winter 2006, at 29 (noting how the corporation is bargaining from a posi-
tion of extreme vulnerability in contrast to the government's powerful position).
14 In an interview with the Corporate CrimeReporter, Mary Jo White, a partner at Debevoise
& Plimpton LLP and former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, stated that
"[i]f the only choice is between a deferred prosecution agreement and an indictment, the
company is going to choose the deferred because it doesn't have the same stigma and same
collateral consequences." Interview with Mary Jo White, 19 CORP. CRIME REP. 48(11) (2005),
available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/maryjowhiteinterviewo io8o6.htm.
i5 See infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 116-4o and accompanying text; see also Derek Teeter, Comment, A
Contracts Analysis of Waivers of the Right to Appeal in Criminal Plea Bargains, 53 U. KA. L. REV.
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not been held to the test of contract law. Specifically, there is no recognition
of established policing mechanisms developed by the courts to oversee the
agreements reached by the parties to a contract.17 Thus, the government
acquires total power over the alleged corporate offender. The net result
is that deferred prosecution agreements are reached without considering
theories of duress and unconscionability.
This article examines deferred and non-prosecution agreements en-
tered into between corporations and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
through the lens of contract policing theory. It adds a new dimension to the
contractual law now applicable to plea bargains and proffer agreements by
suggesting key provisions that should be prohibited in deferred prosecu-
tion agreements. Three provisions common to many deferred prosecution
agreements, or used by the government as leverage to secure a deferred
prosecution agreement, are of particular interest here. These are: (1) the
requirement of a corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege; 8 (2) the
determination of a breach of the agreement being within the sole province
of the government; 9 and (3) the provision that corporations not abide by
previously negotiated contract terms that allow the corporation to pay the
attorney fees of corporate employees."0
The next part of this article provides background on deferred prosecu-
tion agreements and examines terms of concern within these agreements.2 '
In this regard, it looks at constitutional, as well as ethical considerations. As
contract law is not a new phenomena to the criminal law legal landscape,
this article lays the groundwork for the contract discussion by providing an
overview of contract issues that arise in the context of agreements used in
criminal matters."2 Specifically, it then examines the viability of specific
provisions within these agreements when matched up against contract po-
licing principles.2 3 This article concludes that corporations are deprived of
727 (2005) (arguing for a strict application of contract doctrine to the waiver of the right to
appeal in plea bargains); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, ioi
YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) (applying contract law to plea bargains).
17 See Greenblum, supra note 4, at 1899-1903 (arguing that judicial involvement is neces-
sary to help curb prosecutorial overreaching).
18 See infra notes 41-83 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text. There are many other provisions
within deferred prosecution agreements that are considered controversial. For example,
complaints have been levied against the government for the insertion of a clause precluding
the corporation or key individuals within the corporation from taking a position contrary to
the government on certain factual matters. See Eugene Illovsky, Corporate Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 21 CRIM. JUST. 36 (Summer zoo6) (discussing a host of provisions within deferred
prosecution agreements that are controversial).
21 See infra notes 25-116 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 117-4o and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 141-23o and accompanying text.
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basic contract rights as a result of the over-powering prosecutorial power
used in reaching these agreements.1
4
I. THE AGREEMENT
Deferred prosecutions are not new. 5 For years, prosecutors have used
this tool as a way to combat future criminal conduct. A defendant receives
the benefit of not being prosecuted, 6 or the prosecution is held in abey-
ance, in return for his or her compliance with set conditions. Often, the
key condition is that the individual not engage in future criminal con-
duct. Upon a set period of time expiring, the deferred or non-prosecu-
tion agreement is considered completed and the individual is free to as-
sume his or her life without restriction. If a case had, in fact, been filed
against the individual, the expiration of the time period results in a dis-
missal of the matter. This procedure was particularly important to juve-
nile defendants, as it allowed compliance with the law without creating
a criminal history that might impede the individual later in his or her
life. Unlike the corporate scenario where people will forever be able to
"google" the past conduct and have knowledge of the events leading to
the deferred proecution, in juvenile cases the record is closed and often-
times expunged upon completion of the individual reaching maturity.
Recently, prosecutors have been routinely using deferred prosecution
agreements in the corporate context. 7 This phenomena may, in part, be an
outgrowth of the establishment of the President's Corporate Fraud Task
Force, 8 the revision of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
24 See infra notes 230-49 and accompanying text.
25 See Greenblum, supra note 4, at 1866-71 (describing deferred prosecution agreements
outside the corporate context).
26 The government has a pre-trial diversion program that has the accused signing an
agreement with the government to maintain future good conduct in return for non-prosecu-
tion by the government. See 715 USA Form 186 - Pretrial Diversion Agreement, United
States Attorneys Criminal Resource Manual, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-
room/usam/title9/ crmoo7i5.htm (last visited 9-2-o6).
27 See CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, supra note 3 (providing a discussion of the deferred
and non-prosecution agreements up through December zoos); seealso Leonard Post, Deferrals
on Rise in Foreign Bribery, 27 NAT'L L.J. i, I (zoo5) (discussing the rise of deferred prosecution
agreements in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cases).
28 Executive Order 13,271, issued on July 9, 2002, established the President's Corporate
Fraud Task Force. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,o91 (July 9, zooz), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/execorder.htm. The Task Force chair is the Deputy Attorney
General. Larry Thompson, the first individual to hold the position of chair stated that, "[als
we establish with ever increasing certainty the prospect that corporate criminals will lose both
their fortunes and their liberty, we will have gone a long way to restoring the integrity of the
market and the confidence of the nation." The President's Corporate Fraud Task Force,
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/ (last visited 9-2-06).
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Organizations Memo under Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, 9
an increased emphasis on curtailing corporate fraud in a post-Enron world,
a desire to avoid collateral consequences of prosecution such as seen in the
Arthur Anderson, LLP case, a corporate need to contain possible civil litiga-
tion resulting from prosecution, or nothing more than an increased flexing
of prosecutorial power. Clearly, the need to avoid debarment 30 or exclusion31
from government contracts or benefits often provides no choice to a com-
pany but to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement. 3 Corporations
agree to pay hefty fines, 33 restitution, 34 and agree to terms presented by
the government35 in return for not being prosecuted or having an existing
29 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Heads of
Department Components, U.S. Attorneys (January 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/dag/cftf/ corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
30 Debarment, often seen in the context of defense procurement, holds the company
ineligible from doing business with the government. In the defense industry, where most
or all the business is from the government, a conviction carrying a collateral consequence of
debarment can destroy a company. See JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ELLEN S. PODGOR, PAUL D. BORMAN,
& PETER J. HENNING, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 2d 557-59 (zoo3).
31 Program exclusion will mean that the company will be unable to receive government
benefits. This is seen in medical related cases when the company may be excluded from
receiving Medicare or Medicaid benefits. See generally About the OIG Exclusion Program,
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions/aboutexclusions.html (last visited 9-2-06) (describing
how "[biases for exclusion include convictions for program-related fraud and patient abuse,
licensing board actions and default on Health Education Assistance Loans.").
32 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement between the United States Attorney's
Office for the District of Rhode Island and Roger Williams Medical Center 16-17, § 40,
available at http://lawprofessors.rypepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/roger-williams-de-
ferredsentenceagreement.pdf (last visited 9-2-o6) [hereinafter Roger Williams Medical
Center Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (agreeing to terms that will allow the medical cen-
ter to continue to participate in government programs).
33 See, e.g., Agreement between the United States Attorney's Offices for the Central
District of California and the Eastern District of Virginia and The Boeing Company 2-3, §
4, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/boeing2.pdf [hereinafter
Boeing Agreement] (showing how Boeing agreed to pay "a monetary penalty of $50,000,000 to
the United States" within fourteen days of executing the deferred prosecution agreement and
an additional "$565,000,000 to the United States as set forth in [a] Civil Settlement Agreement
and Release executed concurrently."). There are some deferred prosecution agreements with
small fines. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement between the United States Attorney's Office
for the Central District of California, the United States Department of State, and Armour
of America 2 (1993), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/Consent%2oAgreements/1993/
Armor%zoof%2oAmerica,%zolnc/Deferred%zoProsecution%zoAgreement.pdf (agreeing to
a civil penalty of $2o,ooo).
34 See Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alan Vinegrad
and Philip C. Korologos, Counsel to Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. 3 (Apr. 25, 2005) (on file with
authors) (explaining a non-prosecution agreement with Adelphia agreeing to pay $715 million
to security holders who were victims of the fraud).
35 See CORPORATE CRIME Reporter, supra note 3 (discussing how America Online agreed
to pay $15o million into a settlement fund and $60 million as a criminal penalty); see also
Deferred Prosecution Agreement between America Online, Inc., the United States Attorney's
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prosecution deferred.
With many possible rationales as the impetus for an increased use of
deferred prosecution agreements, the blossoming of this procedure is ap-
parent. In the federal system,3 6 one finds a long list of companies entering
into these agreements. 37 Some complaints have been levied against the
government for not providing greater transparency to this process.38 This
is especially vital when some companies bypass criminal prosecution with
a deferred prosecution agreement, while others are subjected to criminal
action.3 9
In addition to voices for consistency in providing the benefit of a de-
ferred prosecution, objections are being raised to the agreements them-
selves or to the process used by the government in obtaining such an agree-
ment. Although there may be many contentious aspects to the agreements
reached between the government and a company, this article focuses on
Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the United States Department of Justice,
Criminal Division 2, § 4, http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/aol.pdf#search
=%22aol%2odeferred%zoprosecution%2oagreement%22 (last visited 8-3o-o6) [hereinafter
America Online Deferred Prosecution Agreement].
36 Deferred prosecution agreements in the corporate context are not limited to the federal
system, as one finds these agreements also being used by state prosecutors. See, e.g., Deferred
Prosecution Agreement between the Travis County Attorney's Office and the Republican
Party of Texas (2005), http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3CI7E2-CDDi- 4 DF6-
92BE-BD 442989 3665%7D/DEFERRED%2oPROSECUTION%2oAGREEMENTdoc.
37 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squipp Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5;
Roger Williams Medical Center Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 32; Deferred
Prosecution Agreement between Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, the United States Department
of Justice, Criminal Division, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the United
States Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/banco.pdf [hereinafter Banco Popular
Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (last visited 8-30-06); DOJ-MCI Agreement, DOJ Letter
to Charles Scheeler, Aug. 30, zoo5 (on file with authors); Agreement between the United
States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Micrus Corporation, and
Micrus S.A. (zoo5), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ documents/micrus.pdf [herein-
after Micrus Agreement]; America Online Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 35;
Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Scott W. Muller and Carey
R. Dunne, Attorneys for Prudential Sec. Inc. (Oct. 27, 1994), available at http://www.corpo-
ratecrimereporter.com/documents/prudential.pdf [hereinafter Prudential Letter]; Letter from
Michael J. Garcia, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Christopher S. Rizek and Scott D.
Michel, Attorneys for Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG (February 13, 2oo6), available
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/hvb-deferred-prosecution-
agreement.pdf [hereinafter Bayerische Letter]; see also CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, supra
note 3 (discussing thirty-four deferred prosecution agreements).
38 See Leonard Post, DeferredProsecutions on Rise in Corporate Bribery Cases, NAT'L L. J.,Aug.
17, 2005, available at http://www.law/com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id+i 123183109360
(discussing the lack of transparency and consistency in deferred prosecution agreements pro-
vided to companies with possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
39 "Mark Mendelsohn, the DOJ criminal fraud section deputy chief, declined to com-
ment about how his office makes charging decisions." Id.
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three of the more egregious provisions found in these contracts or practices
used to secure the agreement.4° In examining the attorney-client privi-
lege waiver, the determination of a breach of the agreement being within
the sole province of the government, and government interference with a
previously negotiated contract provision, it becomes clear that the govern-
ment is using its expansive power to secure agreement terms and this raises
grave concerns regarding contractual fairness.
A. Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege4
Perhaps the most controversial provision sometimes seen in deferred pros-
ecution agreements is a request that the corporation waive its attorney-cli-
ent privilege.4" The source of this provision is likely found in the Principles
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations Memorandum authored by
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, a Memorandum often re-
ferred to as the Thompson Memo.43 This memo for internal guidance of
Department of Justice attorneys lists factors to be considered in deciding
whether to charge a corporation with criminal conduct. One of the factors
that works in favor of the corporation not being indicted is its "timely and
40 Another controversial provision in deferred prosecution agreements is a provision pro-
hibiting corporate "Board of Directors, agents, officers or employees, [from] mak[ing] any
public statement contradicting any statement of fact contained in the Statement of Facts."
Bristol-Myers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 8, § 30; see also, e.g.,
Roger Williams Medical Center Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 32, at 15, § 37;
Letter from Leslie R. Caldwell, Dir., Enron Task Force, U.S. Dep't of Justice to Robert S.
Morvillo and Charles Stillman, Counsel to Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 3, § 7 (Sept. 17, 2003),
available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/wc-DPA/$FILE/Merrill-Lynch-
Agreement.pdf; Non-Prosecution Agreement Between the Bank of New York, the United
States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York, and the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York (2005) (on file with the authors) (providing that
through individuals associated with the company it will not make statements that contradict
with the company's acceptance of responsibility). Companies are also often asked to waive
the applicable statute of limitations, preindictment delay, and speedy trial rights. See, e.g.,
Boeing Agreement, supra note 33, at 4.
41 This section is not exclusive to the attorney-client privilege, but also includes the
work product doctrine. Although these doctrines differ, many of the concepts often overlap
and many of the cases discuss both when an issue related to confidential information be-
tween an attorney and client arise. See generally EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE (4th ed. 2001).
42 A survey conducted by a host of organizations noted the decline of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege in the corporate context. Am. Chemistry Council et al., The Decline of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, available at http://www.nacdl.org/ pub-
lic.nsf/whitecollar/wcnewso24/$FILE/A-C_PrivSurvey.pdf (last visited 9-4-06) (provid-
ing the survey results that were presented to Congress and the United States Sentencing
Commission).
43 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 29, § VI(A) Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations (January 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dagcftf/corpo-
rate-guidelines.htm (last visited 9-2-o6).
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voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate
attorney-client and work product protection."" Thus, a corporation facing
possible prosecution may avoid the government indictment when they co-
operate with the government by providing attorney-client material.45 From
the government's perspective, having the corporation provide this evidence
will mean stronger cases against individuals. 6 The government also avoids
a lengthy investigation process when the corporation packages the items
for the government to use in a later prosecution of corporate employees.
Organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA)47 and the
44 See id. § II(A)(4).
45 See generally, Ross H. Garber, The Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Debate: A Practical
Approach, (paper on file with authors).
46 In the Corporate Crime Reporter's Report on deferred prosecution agreements, they
quote defense attorney Ted Wells as stating:
Ten years ago, it was-save the individuals and plead the corpora-
tion. Now, things have radically changed and it's totally reversed. Now,
the government has set up a system where it's-save the corporation by
sacrificing the individuals. The independent directors hire a law firm,
which becomes in effect a deputized prosecutor. And the individual
executives are sacrificed to save the corporation.
CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, supra note 3.
47 The American Bar Association essentially adopted the Report of the Task Force on
Attorney-Client Privilege to the House of Delegates that provides in part:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association opposes govern-
ment policies, practices and procedures that have the effect of eroding
the constitutional and other legal rights of ("Employees") by requiring,
encouraging or permitting prosecutors or other enforcement authorities
to take into consideration any of the following factors in making a deter-
mination of whether an organization has been cooperative in the context
of a government investigation:
(i) that the organization provided counsel to, or advanced, reim-
bursed or indemnified the legal fees and expenses of, an Employee;
(2) that the organization entered into or continues to operate under a
joint defense, information sharing and common interest agreement with
an Employee or other represented party with whom the organization be-
lieves it has a common interest in defending against the investigation;
(3) that the organization shared its records or other historical infor-
mation relating to the matter under investigation with an Employee; or
(4) that the organization chose to retain or otherwise declined to
sanction an employee who exercised his or her Fifth Amendment right
against self- incrimination in response to a government request for an
interview, testimony, or other information.
AM. BAi Ass'N ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2oo6), available at http://www.
abanet.org/media/docs/3o2Brevised.pdf; see also White Collar Crime, ABA Resolution Calls on
Justice Department to Respect Rights of Corporate Employees, 79 CRIM. L. REP. 688 (2006).
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National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL),48 groups that
have expressed strong views when the government has issued directives
in other contexts that infringe on the attorney-client privilege,49 voiced
strong opposition to the Memorandum's statement that provides a benefit
to companies that waive the attorney-client privilege. 0 Vocal criticism by
these groups and others"1 were the likely impetus for the Department of
Justice's revision of internal policy and issuance of a new Memorandum
commonly referred to as the McNulty Memorandum." The McNulty
Memo continues to allow waivers of the attorney-client privilege but pro-
vides restrictions on requests of this information, including the necessity
to obtain approvals from the Deputy Attorney General for certain kinds of
attorney--client or work product protections.5 3
The United States Sentencing Commission initially had a provision
that encouraged these waivers by providing a benefit to corporations in
the limited circumstance that the waiver was "necessary in order to pro-
vide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known
to the organization."5 4 The Sentencing Commission, however, adopted an
48 NACDL issued a statement on corporate attorney-client privilege that presents
strong arguments to government practices of requesting a waiver as a part of a cooperation
agreement. See National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, NACDL Statement on
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilegeavailableat http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/WhiteCollar/
WCnewsoz4/$FILE/PrivilegeStatemento6.pdf (last visited 9-3-06).
49 See, e.g., ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Recommendation I 1 I, avail-
able at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/WCnewsoo7 (last visited 9-03-06) (provid-
ing that "the American Bar Association opposes the routine practice by government officials of
seeking to obtain a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine through
the granting or denial of any benefit or advantage"). Both the NACDL and ABA opposed
the imposition on the attorney-client privilege when the government engaged in monitoring
conversations in prisons. See Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance
of Attorney-Client Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 145, 148-49 (2003).
50 The Chamber of Commerce has also been actively opposed to a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege. See Testimony Submitted by the United States Chamber of Commerce




51 See Lynnley Browning, Ex-Officials of Justice Dept. Oppose Prosecutors' Tactic in Corporate
Criminal Cases, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2006, at C4.
52 See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components, U.S. Attorneys, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/daglspeech/2oo6
mcnulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulry Memorandum].
53 The McNulry Memo categorizes information in Categories I and II and explicitly
states that "Category II information should only be sought in rare circumstances." Id. at IO.
54 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 n. 12 (2004) (amended 2006). The
United States Sentencing Commission had "added the final sentence in Application Note 12
in 2004 'to address some concerns regarding the relationship between waivers and § 8C2.5(g)."'
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ELLEN S. PODGOR, PAUL D. BORMAN, & PETER J. HENNING, 2oo6 STATUTORY,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
amendment, effective November 1, 2006, that deletes from the corporate
sentencing guidelines this particular sentence so as not to reflect an en-
couragement of corporations waiving the attorney-client privilege.
5
Finally, legislation5 6 was offered for consideration that would restrict
"[in any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter, an
agent or attorney of the United States" from "demand[ing], request[ing]
or conditioning treatment on" this information." The bill proposed by
Senator Specter has the purpose "to place on each agency clear and practi-
cal limits designed to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct protections available to an organization and preserve the constitutional
rights and other legal protections available to employees of such an organi-
z a t i o n . '
' S5
The attorney-client privilege, 9 the work product protection, 60 and cli-
ent confidentiality61 are principles with strong constitutional, 62 evidentia-
DOCUMENTARY AND CASE SUPPLEMENT TO WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 2d 570 n.
(2oo6) [hereinafter ISRAEL ET AL. Supplement] (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8C2.5 historical n. (2oo6)). It stated "[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work prod-
uct protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score under subdivisions
(I) and (2) of subsection (g) unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and
thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2. 5 n. 12 (2004) (amended 2oo6). At that time, the expectation was
that waivers would not be used frequently. ISRAEL ET AL. Supplement, supra note 52, at 570.
55 The Sentencing Commission, however, deleted this sentence in fear that a mention of
a waiver might serve to encourage the government to make a demand for waiver. See Posting
of Sentencing Commission Votes to Remove Attorney-Client Waiver Language to White
Collar Crime Prof Blog, http:/lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime.blog/2006/o4/sen-
tencing.comm.html (Apr. 5, zoo6); see also Richard Ben-Veniste and Raj De, Federal Privilege
Waiver Demands Impact Corporate Compliance, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 24, zoo6, available
at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/stateandlocalbar/2oo6O427000003.
pdf#search=% 2 2also% 2o Richard% 2oBen-Veniste% 2oan d% 2oRaj % 2oDe% 2C% zoFederal%
2oPrivilege%2oWaiver%2oDemands%zolmpact%2oCorporate%2oCompliance%2C%20W
ashington%2oLegal%2oFoundation%2o%22 (discussing the effect of waivers on the attor-
ney-client privilege).
56 There has also been a proposed evidence rule change that would allow businesses
to waive the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. See Proposed Rule 502 on
Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product, https://www.lexisnexis.com/applied-
discovery/lawLibrary/Rule5o2.pdf (last visited 2-23-07).
57 Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, I ioth Cong. § 3(b) (2007).
58 Id. §2(b). Similar legislation was offered in the House of Representatives. See Attorney-
Client Privilege Bill Picking Up Support, available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecol-
larcrimeblog/2007/07/attorney-client.html.
59 See generally EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-
PRODUCT DOCTRINE (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter EPSTEIN Third Edition].
60 Id. at 287-425.
61 "A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of
the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the represen-
tation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (zooz).
62 Courts have cited to violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment when dis-
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ry,6 3 and/or ethical roots.64 At the heart of the attorney-client privilege is the
goal of encouraging "full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the obser-
vance of law and the administration of justice. ' ' 6s The work product protec-
tion specifically covers pre-trial matters. Confidentiality, a core principle
that promotes the ethical duty of loyalty to the client, is a part of a variety
of ethical rules required of practicing attorneys. 66 The ethical rules often
provide mandates beyond those encompassed within the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrines. 67
The attorney-client privilege is an important component of the United
States justice system. It has been held by the Supreme Court to apply
despite the demise of the client.61 Some even maintain that confidentiality
between the attorney and client rises to the level of Sixth Amendment cov-
erage in that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel incorporates "mean-
ingful" representation, something that cannot be assured absent protected
communication between the attorney and client.69 There are, however,
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. For example, one cannot use
the attorney-client privilege to perpetrate a crime or fraud.70
cussing rights of privacy, due process, and effective assistance of counsel. See Podgor & Hall,
supra note 49, at 155-59.
63 The Federal Rules provide common law adoption of the privileges. At present,
there is a proposed Rule 502 that incorporates attorney-client privilege and work-product
protections. On June 30, 2006, the Committee released for comment the proposed rule that
was "unanimously approved" by the Evidence Rules Committee. See Report of the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules (June 30, 2oo6), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf#page=4.
64 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (mandating client confiden-
tiality); R. I. 16 (safekeeping client property).
65 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (I98i).
66 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
67 There are many instances when a waiver of the attorney-client privilege may occur.
These waivers are often not duplicated in the ethics rules. See EPSTEIN Third Edition, supra
note 57, at 158-233 (discussing waivers of the attorney-client privilege).
68 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,403 (1998) (holding that attorney-cli-
ent confidential information would be afforded that protection even after the death of the
client).
69 See Podgor and Hall, supra note 49, at 158 n.92. (listing cases where courts have found
a violation of the Sixth Amendment when there was a violation of the attorney-client privi-
lege).
70 The crime-fraud exception relates to communications regarding present or future
crimes and not past crimes. See ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 30, at 751;
see also Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime:
How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 405, 459 (1993). In the
case of Enron Broadband Services, L.P v. Travelers Casually and Surely Co. of America (In re
Enron Corp.), the court held that communications of executives with in-house counsel would
not be protected by the attorney-client privilege because of the crime-fraud exception.
349 B.R. 115, 1i19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Beth Bar, Judge Rules No Privilege in Enron
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The strong historical basis and acceptance of the attorney-client privi-
lege7 and the inclusion of ethical mandates of confidentiality within the
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct have not deterred the government from
requiring corporations to add waivers of this privilege in deferred prosecu-
tion agreements.72 In a recent press conference, Deputy Attorney General
Paul J. McNulty stated that "[tihe waiving of attorney-client privileged
information is a standard piece of the settlements that the Department
of Justice has reached in the past."73 The waiver may merely incorporate
an acknowledgment that privileged material has been turned over to the
government and affirm that this cooperation will continue.74 Other agree-
ments may limit the waiver so as not to include certain information" or
may specify exactly what material is included.7 6 Many of the agreements
limit the waiver to the government and the corporation, with an explicit
Fraud Case, 236 N.Y.L.J. 1, col. 3, Aug. 29, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id+i 156855191oi9.
71 See generally Mark A. Kressel, Note, Contractual Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 116 Yale L.J. 412 (2006) (discussing the importance of prior contractual agreements
between corporate directors and the corporation).
72 The DOJ and a company may also enter into a separate agreement exclusively fo-
cused on the waiver issues. See, e.g., Confidentiality and Limited Waiver Agreement between
the United States Attorney's Office and the Bank of New York (May 27, 2003) (on file with
authors).
73 Transcript of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at Press Conference Regarding
Prudential Equity Group Securities Fraud Allegations, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/zoo6/dag-speech -o6o8z8.htm (last visited Sept. 4, zoo6).
74 The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York and Symbol
Technologies, Inc. Agreement states that pursuant to a prior agreement with the Securities
Exchange Commission, "Symbol has shared the results of its investigation, including docu-
ments that could have otherwise been withheld under the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine, with the Investigative Entities." Agreement between Symbol
Technologies, Inc. and The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York z, §
4 (2oo4), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/SymbolAgreement.
FINALwpd.pdf. This agreement also then states that "Symbol acknowledges that its prior,
ongoing, and future cooperation are important factors in the Office's decision to enter into the
Agreement, and therefore, Symbol agrees to continue to cooperate fully with the Investigative
Entities regarding any matter about which Symbol has knowledge." Id.; see also Settlement
Agreement between the United States of America, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and
Lazard Freres & Co. LLC 19 (Oct. 26, 1995), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.
com/documents/ lazard.pdf (noting in a non-prosecution agreement that "Lazard and Lazard
LLC responded promptly to requests for business records and waived the attorney-client
privilege").
75 The agreement between the United States and the Roger Williams Medical Center
(RWMC) provides for a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work product protec-
tion, but in addition to stating that the waiver does not apply to third parties, also states that
RWMC may assert the privilege with respect to privileged communications "that post-date
the criminal investigation." Roger Williams Medical Center Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 32, at 3.
76 See, e.g., Micrus Agreement, supra note 37, at 5-6 (listing items that the company may
not assert a claim of attorney-client and work product privilege).
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statement that the waiver will not apply to third parties.7 Others provide
specific dates covered by the waiver of confidential information. 71 Still oth-
ers permit dissemination to third parties when it is determined that it is
in furtherance of a government objective. 79 Finally, some agreements rec-
ognize that the attorney-client privilege may need to be waived, but omit
the specific conditions for this waiver from the deferred prosecution agree-
ment.
80
There are clear ramifications to a corporate waiver of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. 8' Compliance programs are likely to prove ineffective when
employees are unwilling to participate and provide information for fear that
the material may find its way to government prosecutors."2 Knowing that the
corporation may waive the attorney-client privilege, corporate employees
may be less likely to report internal corporate problems, to seek advice in
resolving possible legal issues, or offer cooperation to internal and external
auditors who may be investigating corporate misconduct.8 3 Transparency
77 See, e.g., Prudential Letter, supra note 37, at 2 (stating that "PSI does not intend to
waive as to third parties any attorney-client or other applicable privilege that may cover the
materials or information."); Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States of
America and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 4, § 9.3 (Jan. i, 2oo6) (on file with the
authors) (stating that "FENOC does not waive the attorney-client privilege or the work-
product protection, or other applicable privileges as to third parties.").
78 See, e.g., America Online Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 35, at 4, § 8 (list-
ing specific dates and type of materials covered by the waiver).
79 In the deferred prosecution agreement between Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey, it explicitly states that attorney-cli-
ent material will not be disclosed to third parties unless "in its sole discretion, that disclosure
is otherwise required by law or would be in furtherance of the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of the Office." Bristol-Myers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra
note 5, at 9, § 3 1(d).
80 In the deferred prosecution agreement between the United States Attorney's Offices
for the Central District of California and the Eastern District of Virginia and The Boeing
Company, it leaves the question of waiver for further negotiation in stating that "if requested
by the USAOs, [Boeing shall] negotiate in good faith to attempt to arrive at a limited waiver
of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine sufficient to allow the USAOs to
be provided with identified materials otherwise withheld under a claim of these protections."
Boeing Agreement, supra note 33, at 5, § 6.
81 See generally Lonnie T Brown Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897 (2OO6) (proposing
the "establishment of a uniform corporate attorney-client privilege").
82 See generally Testimony of Gerald B. Lefcourt, On Behalf of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Before the ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege
5-6 (April 21, 2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legislation/WhiteCollarooi
/$FILE/LefcourtFestimony.pdf (discussing problems with a corporate waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege, such as how "individuals cannot communicate candidly and effectively
with in-house counsel in order to prevent compliance problems").
83 See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Cooperators: The Government in Employer-Employee
Relationships, 23 C~aDozo L. REv. 795 (2002) (discussing the ramifications of pitting the em-
ployer against the employee in instances of corporate cooperation).
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diminishes when employees fear that their statements and documents may
become government discovery. Additionally, the corporation is no longer
working as a unified entity for the benefit of the shareholders and consum-
ers. A corporate approach is lost as each person or entity strives to protect
his or her individual interest.
B. Government Exclusivity in Determining Breaches
of Deferred Prosecution Agreements
Deferred and non-prosecution agreements often occur without judicial
oversight or participation.' This is because the agreement may be reached
prior to an indictment, and thus no court case will have been filed, or be-
cause the government may reach a settlement with a company that is en-
tered into outside of the criminal justice system. Even in the rare case that
has court participation, it is usually a mere formality of the document being
filed in the court.85 It may be presented to the court to satisfy the statutory
provision that exempts the deferral of criminal matters from the speedy
trial constraints.86
Although negotiated resolutions offer enormous economic benefit,
the omission of judicial oversight raises concerns when the determination
of whether there is a breach of the agreement rests within the exclusive
province of one party, and that party is the government, a party with ex-
traordinary power .8 Unlike the classic plea bargain scenario, a corporation
84 In cases of court approval, it may just be a situation of the court participating pursu-
ant to j8 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), to allow the case to be held in abeyance for a period of time to
allow the "defendant to demonstrate its good conduct." See Unexecuted Order of the Court
between the United States and Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (2003), available at http://www.
corporatecrimereporter.com/documentsbanco.pdf.
85 See Roger Williams Medical Center Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note
32 (showing a deferred prosecution agreement that has been filed in a court case); America
Online Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 35 (same).
86 18 U.S.C. § 316i(h)(z) provides that:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the
time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or
in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must
commence: ...
(a) Any period of delay during which prosecu-
tion is deferred by the attorney for the Government
pursuant to written agreement with the defendant,
with the approval of the court, for the purpose of
allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good
conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2ooo).
87 One concern is that when a breach occurs, statements previously made by the corpora-
tion can now be used against it. See Ben Vernia, Here's Your Story, and You're Sticking to It, 29
LEGAL TMEs No. 34, Aug. 21, 2oo6, available at http://www.cov.com/publications/download/
[Vol. 96
2007- 2oo8] CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS
enters into the agreement without a court first asking whether there is an
understanding that rights are being waived and that there is a voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing assent to the agreement.88
One finds prosecution dominance in deferred prosecution agreements
as these agreements often include provisions which provide that the gov-
ernment will be the sole determining body of any breach by the corpora-
tion.89 Some agreements will specify that in addition to the government
having the sole discretion to determine whether there has been a breach of
the deferred prosecution agreement, this determination is not subject to re-
view.' Often the agreement will provide that the company has a time peri-
od to contest the determination of breach with the Department of Justice.9 1
The agreement may even provide that upon the government deciding a
breach has occurred, the admissions made by a company in reaching the
agreement will be deemed admissible. 9 One agreement goes so far as to
oid5446/66 .pdf#search=%22Here%E2%8o%9Bs%zoYour%2oStoy%ZC%oand%oYou%E
2%8o%9Bre%2oSticking%2oto%2olt%2C%20%22.
88 See infra notes 141-205 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., Micrus Agreement, supra note 37, at 3, § 7 (stating that DOJ "in its sole reason-
able discretion" determines whether there has been a breach of the agreement); Prudential
Letter, supra note 37, at 4 (stating that "it is agreed that in the event that this office, in its sole
discretion, determines that PSI has violated any provision of this Agreement .... "); Deferred
Prosecution Agreement between AmSouth Bancorporation, AmSouth Bank, and the United
States 5, § Io, available at http:l/www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/amsouth.pdf
(last visited 9-1-o6) (stating that "[sihould the United States, in its sole discretion, deter-
mine during the term of this Agreement that AmSouth has committed any federal crime com-
menced subsequent to the date of this Agreement, AmSouth shall thereafter be subject to
prosecution for any federal crimes of which the United States has knowledge.").
90 See, e.g., University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey Deferred Prosecution
Agreement (UMDNJ), supra note 8, at 7, § 24 (stating that "whether UMDNJ has breached
this Agreement rests solely in the discretion of the Office, and the exercise of discretion by
the Office under this paragraph is not subject to review in any court or tribunal outside the
Department of Justice").
91 See, e.g., Banco Popular Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 37, at 6 (provid-
ing the company with two weeks to respond to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division notice of an alleged breach); Deferred Prosecution Agreement between PNC ICLC
Corp. and the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section 5-6,
§ 12 (2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/wc-DPA/$FILE/DPA-
PNC.pdf.
92 Micrus Agreement, supra note 37, at 7, § 21 (providing that admissions of the com-
pany which are included as Appendixes to the agreement will serve as a "binding admission
to the Department only, and . . . the Department may use and admit into evidence in any
proceeding and for any purpose, and without objection by Micrus"); Deferred Prosecution
Agreement between AIG-FP Pagic Equity Holding Corp. and the United States Department
of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section 3, 1 9, available at http://www.corporatecrimere-
porter.com/ documents/aig.pdf#search=%22AIG-FP%2oPAGIC%2odeferred%2oprosecutio
n%22 (last visited 8-30-06) (stating that "[tlhe decision whether conduct and statements of
any individual will be imputed to AIG-FP PAGIC for the purpose of determining whether
AIG-FP PAGIC has committed a willful and knowing material breach of any provision of this
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allow the government to select from several different options the remedy it
desires for the purported breach of the agreement by the company.93
Thus, the signing of a deferred prosecution agreement may have enor-
mous repercussions to a company if the government singlehandedly de-
cides that a breach has occurred. The company signing the deferred pros-
ecution agreement would be left with little recourse to object to the gov-
ernment determination that a breach had occurred,94 and in some cases no
right to appeal.
C. Government Interference With Contracts to Pay Attorney Fees
Among the many provisions found in the different deferred prosecution
agreements are provisions that pertain to third parties or individuals who
are not directly a part of the agreement. For example, one finds provisions
that call for the termination of employees who fail to cooperate with the
investigation. 95 There may also be provisions regarding what notifications
need to be included if there is a sale or merger, so as to apprise a purchaser
of the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement. 96
Recently, a practice that has caused significant controversy is one that
calls for the company not to pay for or reimburse attorney fees of employ-
ees indicted by the government.97 This comes from the Thompson Memo
Agreement shall be in the sole reasonable discretion of the Department.").
93 See Bayerische Letter, supra note 37, at 11-12, § 17 (providing that the DOJ may select
from a choice of remedies found in three different paragraphs in the agreement, "or instead
choose to extend the period of deferral of prosecution pursuant to" another paragraph in the
agreement).
94 It is difficult to ascertain the full effect of the acquiescence by the company to terms
that name the government as the exclusive decision-maker of a breach, in that to date the
government has not proceeded against a company for breach of the agreement. The mere pos-
sibility of this happening may cause a company to provide immediate resignation to govern-
ment demands or pressure. See Posting of Is Bristol-Myers Risking a Violation of Its Deferred
Prosecution Agreement? to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
whitecollarcrime-blogl2oo6/o8/is bristolmyers.html (Aug. 19, 2006).
95 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement between ComputerAssociates International,
Inc. and the United States Attorney's Offfice for the Eastern District of New York 3, § 4(b)
(Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/wcDPA/ $FILE/
DPA-CA.pdf.
96 See, e.g.,Agreement between AEP Energy Services, Inc., the United States Department
of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of Ohio § I5, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ docu-
ments/aep.pdf (last visited 9-1-o6) (requiring the company to "include in any contract for
sale or merger a provision binding the purchaser/successor to the obligations described in this
Agreement.").
97 See Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense
Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part I), 7 U.C. DAvis Bus. L.J. 2 (2oo6) (discussing whether there
should be an advancement of legal fees for executives defending themselves on corporate
crime charges).
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language which provides that a factor to be used by the government in de-
ciding whether to charge "is whether the corporation appears to be protect-
ing its culpable employees and agents." 98 The Memo explicitly states that
in weighing cooperation, the government will look at factors such as how
the corporation supports "culpable employees and agents." 99 This can be
through the "advancing of attorney fees, through retaining the employees
without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing information to
the employees about the government's investigation pursuant to a joint de-
fense agreement."'' ° The more recent McNulty Memorandum somewhat
tempers this position in stating that "[p]rosecutors generally should not
take into account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys' fees to em-
ployees or agents under investigation and indictment."10'
Although an actual term stating that the corporation is precluded from
paying attorney fees of indicted individuals may be omitted from the de-
ferred prosecution agreement, the agreement will call for full cooperation
and the determination of a breach of the agreement will rest within the
sole discretion of the government."' 2 This does not change with the more
recent McNulty Memorandum, except attorneys within the Department of
Justice will likely be hesitant to explicitly request that a corporation waive
the payment of attorney fees.
In the deferred prosecution agreement in the KPMG case, it states that
the company "acknowledges and understands that its cooperation with the
criminal investigation by the Office is an important and material factor un-
derlying the Office's decision to enter into the Agreement."10 3  During
the negotiation process to obtain the deferred prosecution agreement, the
Assistant United States Attorney's had meeting points that included ques-
tions of whether KPMG was paying or going to pay the legal fees of its
employees.' 4
98 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 29, § VI(B).
99 Id.
Ioo Id. The Memo does provide a footnote that "[slome states require corporations to
pay the legal fees of officers under investigation prior to a formal determination of their guilt.
Obviously, a corporation's compliance with governing law should not be considered a failure
to cooperate." Id. § VI(B) n.4.
1oI McNulty Memorandum, supra note 52, at i i.
Io2 See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
103 Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Robert S.
Bennett, Attorney for KPMG LLP 9, § 7 (Aug. 26, zooS), available at http://www.nacdl.org/
public.nsf/whitecollar/wcDPA/$FILE/KPMG.pdf [hereinafter KPMG Letter] (last visited
9-2-o6). The agreement further provides that "KPMG agrees that its continuing cooperation
with the Office's investigation shall include, but not be limited to," a list of items then speci-
fied, one of which calls for a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at Io, § 8(e).
104 See United States v. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330,341 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (including ques-
tions such as "Is KPMG paying/going to pay the legal fees of employees? Current or former?
What about taxpayers?"). There were also comments made that "misconduct [cannot] [ble
rewarded" and "misconduct [should not] be rewarded" referring to federal guidelines. Id. at
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
KPMG, a company that had a long-standing practice of paying "the le-
gal defense of its personnel, regardless of the cost and regardless of wheth-
er its personnel were charged with crimes,"01 s refused to pay these fees in
order to secure a deferred prosecution agreement and in order to maintain
its continuing cooperation.0 6 The deferred prosecution agreement was es-
pecially important for KPMG to have because of the auditing nature of its
work, with debarment by the government as a possible consequence. 07 As
eloquently stated by Judge Lewis Kaplan in an opinion, "KPMG refused
to pay [the attorney fees of individuals indicted] because the government
had the proverbial gun to its head."100 This district court judge noted that
"[h]ad that pressure not been brought to bear, KPMG would have paid
these defendants' legal expenses."'0 9
In United States v. Stein I,110 Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of
New York found that government interference with employees' rights "to
a fair trial and to the effective assistance of counsel" violated the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment to the Constitution."' The court stated that "[t]he
Thompson Memorandum and the USAO pressure on KPMG to deny or
cut off defendants' attorneys' fees necessarily impinge upon the KPMG
Defendants' ability to defend themselves.""' Judge Kaplan also stated
that "the government's interference in the KPMG Defendants' ability to
mount a defense 'creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes
faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general."" I3 The court
in this first decision held that although this government conduct did not
rise to the level of requiring dismissal of the indictment against the charged
individuals related to KPMG, it did merit some relief for these particu-
lar defendants."4 In United States v. Stein H1, Judge Kaplan re-examined
343 (clarification added since shorthand was used in the case).
105 Id. at 336; see also id. at 356 n.119.
Io6 Seeid. at344-45.
107 It is particularly noteworthy here that some of the auditing work being performed by
KPMG was regarding the Department of Justice's financial statements. The agreement states
that "[tihe Department of Justice's debarring official has determined that KPMG is currently
a responsible contractor." KMPG Letter, supra note 103, at 26, § 2 1.
io8 Stein 1, 435 ESupp.zd at 336.
1o9 Id.
110 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
iii Id. at 382.
112 Id. at 362.
113 Id. at 372 (citation omitted).
114 The court's remedy was:
i. The Court declares that so much of the Thompson Memorandum
and the activities of the USAO as threatened to take into account, in
deciding whether to indict KPMG, whether KPMG would advance at-
torneys' fees to present or former employees in the event they were
indicted for activities undertaken in the course of their employment
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the remedy issue and found that the prosecutor's conduct was "outrageous
and shocking." He then dismissed thirteen defendants from this criminal
case.
15
Deferred prosecution agreements that require a company to disregard
rights or contracts to third parties are asking the company to breach previ-
ously negotiated agreements. Even premising the ability to secure the ben-
efit of a deferred prosecution agreement on a company disregarding previ-
ously negotiated contracts is improper. By asking a company not to pay
attorney fees of employees, the government is using its enormous power to
place individual defendants without the ability to properly defend them-
selves in actions against the government.116 This can be a detriment to the
interfered with the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel and therefore violated the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution.
2. The government shall adhere to its representation that any pay-
ment by KPMG of the defense costs of the KPMG Defendants is ac-
ceptable to the government and will not be considered in determin-
ing whether KPMG has complied with the DPA or otherwise prejudice
KPMG.
3. The Clerk shall open a civil docket number to accommodate the
claims of the KPMG Defendants against KPMG for advancement of
defense costs should they elect to pursue them. If they file a complaint
within 14 days, the Clerk shall issue a summons to KPMG. The Court in
that event will entertain the claims pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction
over this case.
The motions are denied insofar as they seek monetary sanctions against
the government. The Court reserves decision as to whether to grant ad-
ditional relief.
Id. at 382; see also Judge Condemns DOJ Policy of Pressuring Companies Not to Pay Employees'
Legal Fees, 22 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 342 (July 12, 2006); Terry Carter, Judge Blasts
Prosecutor Fee Pressure, 5 No. 27 A.B.A. J. E-Report I (zoo6). KPMG challenged the district
court order and pursuant to a court invitation, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan filed a response com-
menting on issues related to the district court's jurisdiction. See Response to Rule 2I(b)(4)
Invitation, United States v. Stein, No. o6 Civ. 5007 (zd Cir. filed Jan. 8, 2007), available at
http://Iawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/kaplan2ostein2OmemOzOtO-
zosecond2ocircuit2ojan2o82o2oo6.pdf.
115 United States v. Stein II, No. Si 05 Crim. o888(LAK), 2007 WL 2050921, at 15-17,
26 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007).
i6 The cost of attorney fees in white collar cases can be extremely high. As
stated by the court in Stein 1:
This is by no means a garden-variety criminal case. It has been
described as the largest tax fraud case in United States history. The
government thus far has produced in discovery, in electronic or paper
form, at least 5 million to 6 million pages of documents plus transcripts
of 335 depositions and 195 income tax returns. The briefs on pretrial
motions passed the i,ooo-page mark some time ago. The government
expects its case in chief to last three months, while defendants expect
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individual and to the company's ability to hire future employees and to
negotiate future contracts with individuals. Further, it puts enormous pres-
sure on the affected employees to cooperate with the government since
they will not be reimbursed for their attorney fees.
II. THE APPLICATION OF CONTRACT LAW TO AGREEMENTS
USED IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
A. General Applications of Contract Law in the Criminal Justice Process
It is well settled that principles of contract law apply to bargained agree-
ments, regardless of their subject matter. Although courts may be very
comfortable enforcing commercial contracts,"7 they are also accustomed to
using traditional contract law to determine the enforceability of many other
types of agreements, whether they are in the criminal justice system," 8 the
family court system," 9 the international arena,2 ° or other areas of the law.
The use of contract law to enforce promises in the criminal justice sys-
theirs to be lengthy as well. To prepare for and try a case of such length
requires substantial resources. Yet the government has interfered with
the ability of the KPMG Defendants to obtain resources they otherwise
would have had. Unless remedied, this interference almost certainly will
affect what these defendants can afford to permit their counsel to do.
This would impact the defendants' ability to present the defense they
wish to present by limiting the means lawfully available to them. The
Thompson Memorandum and the USAO's actions therefore are subject
to strict scrutiny.
Stein , 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362 (footnotes omitted).
117 This is stating the obvious. One can review any commercial law textbook and find a
multitude of commercial contract cases. See, e.g., DANIEL KEATING, SALES A SYSTEMS APPROACH
(3d ed. zoo6).
I18 See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 2o E3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining plea
agreements are enforced under the doctrines of contract law); United States v. Conway, 81
E3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating plea agreements are subject to the principles of contract
law); United States v. Smith, 976 F 2d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 1992) (using contract law to interpret
an immunity agreement); United States v. Parra, 302 F. Supp. 2d 226, 235-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that proffer agreement was enforceable under contract law principles).
I19 See, e.g., Faith H. Spencer, Expanding Marital Options: Enforcement of Premarital
Contracts During Marriage, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 281 (1989) (documenting the use of con-
tract law to enforce premarital agreements after death or divorce); Brian Bix, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1998) (discussing the intersection of contract and family law).
120 See, e.g., Sunil R. Harjani, The Convention on Contracts For the International Sale of
Goods in United States Courts, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49, 70-88 (2000) (analyzing five significant
cases in United States courts that apply contract law to international transactions); Burt A.
Leete, Contract Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 193 (1992) (discussing United Sates contract formation principles as they intersect with
international contract law).
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tem began over thirty-five years ago with the Supreme Court's decision
in Santobello v. New York.' a' In Santobello, the State failed to adhere to a
bargained promise it had made to the accused as part of a plea negotiation.
The state agreed it would make no recommendation as to the punishment
the court should assess after the accused entered his guilty plea to gam-
bling crimes. The Court used a typical contract analysis and noted that,
although circumstances may vary, when a prosecutor makes a promise and
it is at least part of the consideration for a defendant's guilty plea, the prom-
ise must be fulfilled.' 2 Once the Court determined that the prosecution's
promise merited enforcement, it remanded the case to the state court to
determine the appropriate relief. The court's options included specific per-
formance"2 3 or recision of the contract. The latter would have allowed the
accused to withdraw his promise to the prosecutor to plead guilty.12 4 Since
Santobello, courts consistently use contract law to analyze plea agreements
gone awry in the criminal justice system.2 5
Santobello provides the basis for courts to use contract principles in a
host of criminal law matters. Following the lead in Santobello, one finds
contract theory permeating the legal landscape in the plea bargain con-
text 2 6 and also in other agreements"7 that arise in the criminal justice pro-
cess. Courts in almost all scenarios follow traditional principles of contract
doctrine when analyzing agreements2 8 made and enforced in the criminal
121 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (holding plea agreements arranged through a contract or
promise from the prosecution must be enforced).
122 Id.
123 In the plea bargain context, specific performance is the least onerous of remedies
because it simply requires resentencing by a different judge. See e.g., id. at 263 (reserving the
decision regarding proper relief to the state court); United States v. Peglera, 33 F3d 412, 415
(4 th Cir. 1994) (requiring the prosecution to fulfill its promise under the plea agreement).
124 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263.
125 See, e.g., Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F 3 d 688, 695 (9 th Cir. 2oo6) (stating that California
law clearly requires a court to apply contract law to disputes about the enforceability of plea
agreements), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2094 (2007); United States v. Smallwood, 311 E Supp. 2d
535, 542-43 (E.D. Va. 2004) (recognizing that general contract law principles apply to the en-
forcement of plea agreements); United States v. Ready, 82 F 3 d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
that plea agreements are construed using contract law doctrine); United States v. Olesen, 920
F.2d 538, 541-42 (8th Cir. 199o) (applying contract principles to determine the reformation of
a plea agreement).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 269 E 3 d 859,86 1(7th Cir. zoos) (applying the require-
ment of consideration in contract doctrine to plea agreements); United States v. Garcia, 956
F2d 41,43-44 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing the relationship of commercial contract law to plea
agreements); Ready, 8z F 3d at 558 (following the Fourth Circuit when analyzing plea agree-
ments through contract law).
127 See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 21o F. Supp. 2d 465, 475 (S.D.N.Y. zooz) (holding
that a proffer agreement is a contract and is analyzed using contract doctrine); United States
v. Oruche, 257 E Supp. zd 230, 237-738 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that immunity agreements are
analyzed using contract law).
128 See United States v. Conway, 81 E3d 15, 17 (ist Cir. 1996) (clarifying that a plea
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justice system. This includes interpretation of plea agreements,2 9 use of
canons of construction, 30 the law of conditions, 3' promissory estoppel,
32
the parol evidence rule when ascertaining the ability of a party to add an
oral promise to a plea bargain,1 33 material breach versus substantial per-
formance analysis, 34 modification of contracts, 31 frustration of purpose,
136
intent driven interpretation, 37 the need for consideration to make an agree-
ment binding, 3' illusory promises,139 and assumption of the risk of future
bargain is a contract where the government obtains a conviction as consideration for the de-
fendant's opportunity for a reduced sentence).
IZ9 See, e.g., United States v. McQueen, io8 F3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1997) (declaring plea
agreements are interpreted in accordance with contract law); United States v. Speelman, 431
E3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cit. 2005) (stating terms included in a plea agreement are interpreted
through contract law); United States v. Cimino, 381 F3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (interpreting
specific provisions of a plea agreement in favor of the prosecution).
130 Such uses include interpreting ambiguities against the drafter. See United States
v. Rivera, 357 E3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2004) (construing a plea agreement containing multiple
sentencing provisions against the prosecution).
131 See, e.g., United States v. Saunders, 226 E Supp. 2d 796, 802 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting
that before the government would be required to file a motion under the plea agreement
requesting a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, the defendant must first
meet a condition precedent of providing substantial assistance to the government), aff'd, 55
Fed. Appx. 694 (4th Cir. 2003).
132 Courts, however, always refer to detrimental reliance as the singular requirement.
See United States v. Coon, 805 E2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding the defendant did not
detrimentally rely on a plea agreement when he voluntarily agreed to it and was aware of its
direct consequences).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, i E3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling modifications
violated the parol evidence rule when a plea agreement was completely integrated); Id. at
872 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (referring to such important contract concepts as course of per-
formance in interpretation); United States v. Garcia, 956 Ezd 41 , 44 (4 th Cir. 1992) (requiring
the prosecution uphold the provisions contained in a cover letter that accompanied a plea
agreement).
134 Although courts do not follow the typical analysis as they uphold plea agreements in
spite of a material breach. See United States v. Fitch, 964 E2d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 1992) (restrict-
ing the prosecution to specified remedies in the plea agreement despite a material breach).
135 See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 378 E 3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that in most
cases contract principles apply when a party attempts to modify a plea agreement).
136 Frustration of purpose can be used as a defense when the government needs an es-
cape valve to release it from the plea bargain. See United States v. Thompson, 237 F3d 1258,
1261 (ioth Cir. zool) (ruling the prosecution was no longer bound to a plea bargain when a
supervening event frustrated the purpose of the agreement).
137 See, e.g., Buckley v. Terhune, 441 E3d 688, 695-98 (9th Cit. 2006) (holding that the
interpretation of a plea agreement is governed by contract law and that requires a court to
determine the intent of the parties), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2094 (2007).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 134 F3d 1435, 1437 (ioth Cir. 1998) (noting that
there was consideration to support a waiver of appeal in plea agreement).
139 See United States v. Zweber, 913 E2d 705, 7 11 (9th Cir. 199o) (holding the prosecu-
tion's promise under a plea bargain was not illusory when it agreed to recommend a reduced
sentence).
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changes in the criminal law that work to the disadvantage of the defen-
dant.140
B. Basic Contract Concepts Applied to Ctiminal Matters
Contract law requires all agreements to have consideration and assent.
When applied in the criminal context, one of these concepts, assent, re-
ceives special treatment by courts. 41 Other than in the requirement of
assent, one does not find a major deviation from contract rules when exam-
ining enforcement principles.
As any first year contracts student quickly learns, consideration is a ba-
sic element for an enforceable contract. The main theory underpinning
contract law is that the courts will enforce freely entered agreements when
parties exchange promises with each other.14 Although this exchange does
not demand equality, it does require that each party receive something of
value in the bargain.
143
In addition to consideration, assent is also essential to the formation of a
valid contract. Normally in contract law, the parties are the sole actors who
assent to the agreement and it is a contract between private individuals.
Applied in the criminal law arena, however, one finds an added layer to
the assent process in that the judiciary plays a crucial role in determining
whether true assent has in fact occurred.'"
140 See. e.g., United States v. Bownes, 405 F3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
defendant's argument that a change in law should be taken into consideration despite a pre-
existing plea agreement); United States v. Pappas, 409 F3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (enforcing
an express agreement concerning restitution regardless of statutory requirements).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Kennell, 15 F3d 134, 136-39(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that civil
contract law cannot be applied rigidly in the criminal context of plea agreements when de-
termining whether a defendant voluntarily assented to a plea agreement because the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure require a court to ascertain whether a plea agreement is volun-
tary and there is actual assent to a plea agreement).
142 See, e.g., Herremans v. Carrera Designs, Inc., 157 F3d i 118, 1122 (7th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that an exchange of promises between an at will employee and his employer was sufficient
to form a binding contract); Samra v. Shaheen Bus. & Inv. Group, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 483,
502 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that American contract law enforces agreements where promises
are exchanged freely and voluntarily with an intent to enter into a contract); Owen v. MBPXL
Corp., 173 E Supp. zd 905, 915 (N.D. Iowa zoo) (recognizing that contract doctrine also en-
forces unilateral agreements where one party makes a promise in exchange for an action on
the part of the other party).
143 See, e.g., Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 E Supp. 211, 2I8--9 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (noting that the
law of contracts does not require equal value or symmetry to have a valid contract and that
a court will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration), rev'd sub nom. Ryan v. J. C.
Penney Co., 627 E2d 836 (7th Cir. i98o); Pierson v. Willets Point Contracting Corp., 899 F.
Supp. 1033, io44 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that the adequacy of the consideration is not
a proper subject of judicial scrutiny because parties are free to enter into bargains where the
considerations for a contract are totally unequal).
144 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule i i provides extensive rules regarding the
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court's review of a plea prior to its acceptance, and the determination of it being voluntary.
Specifically it states in part (b)(-(3) the following:
(i) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court ac-
cepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed
under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open
court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and
determine that the defendant understands, the following:
(A) the government's right, in a prosecution
for perjury or false statement, to use against the
defendant any statement that the defendant gives
under oath;
(B) the right to plead not guilty, or having al-
ready so pleaded, to persist in that plea;
(C) the right to a jury trial;
(D) the right to be represented by counsel-
and if necessary have the court appoint counsel-
at trial and at every other stage of the proceeding;
(E) the right at trial to confront and cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses, to be protected from
compelled self-incrimination, to testify and pres-
ent evidence, and to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses;
(F) the defendant's waiver of these trial rights
if the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere;
(G) the nature of each charge to which the de-
fendant is pleading;
(H) any maximum possible penalty, includ-
ing imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised
release;
(I) any mandatory minimum penalty;
(J) any applicable forfeiture;
(K) the court's authority to order restitution;
(L) the court's obligation to impose a special
assessment;
(M) the court's obligation to apply the
Sentencing Guidelines, and the court's discretion
to depart from those guidelines under some cir-
cumstances; and
(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provi-
sion waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally
attack the sentence.
(2) Ensuring That a Plea Is Voluntary. Before accepting a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant per-
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In the criminal law context, the government and accused have certain
constraints upon their ability to enter into an enforceable contract. They
are not left to their own devices to work out the agreement, as the agree-
ment may be worthless if not accepted by the court.'45 Fundamental con-
stitutional rights may be a factor in determining whether a court will accept
a plea bargain entered into between the prosecution and defense. Judges
are required to question the accused on the record to ascertain whether the
defendant is pleading guilty voluntarily and of his or her own free will."4
Thus, the judiciary provides oversight as to the validity of the assent of the
agreement.
In addition to consideration and assent, there is another dimension to
the application of contract law to plea bargain agreements. This pertains to
whether there is a breach and the ability to withdraw from the agreement.
Normally, in contract law a breach either results in litigation to enforce the
promises, agreement between the parties as to how to deal with a breach,
or the injured party chooses to return to a pre-negotiation status. This con-
trasts with criminal plea bargain law, where the government does not have
the power to unilaterally declare a breach and withdraw its promise. 147
C. Duress & Unconscionabiliy
Duress and unconscionability are policing concepts used by the courts to
restrain a party with superior bargaining power from taking advantage of
a less powerful party. These concepts place limits on the enforceability
of agreements that are unfair and one-sided. 4 In providing this equal-
sonally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did
not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea
agreement).
(3) Determining the Factual Basis for a Plea. Before entering judg-
ment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. I i(b).
145 See id.
146 See supra note 144; see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (requiring a
showing on the record that a guilty plea was made "intelligently and knowingly").
147 See United States v. Guzman, 318 E3d 1191, 1196 (ioth Cir. 2003) (explaining the
government may not withdraw from the agreement before holding a hearing to determine
whether it breached).
148 See, e.g., LTV Energy Prods. Co. v. N. States Contracting Co. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 162 B.R. 949,959 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that the doctrine of unconscionability
prohibits one-sided contracts to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise" without upsetting
the risks allocated to superior bargaining power); Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. Directv,
Inc., 319 E Supp. 2d 1040, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that contracts may be avoided if they
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the facts existing at the time of contracting);
Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. Eppinger (In re Eppinger), 61 B.R. 89, 94 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986) (noting that duress from the marital relationship caused the debtor to sign a one-sided
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izing function, it does not necessarily require elimination of the entire con-
tract.' 49 Rather, a court may remove troubling terms within a contract but
keep intact the remainder of the agreement.15 °
1. Duress.-The doctrine of duress considers whether a party to a contract
is entering the contract because of compulsion instead of true assent to the
contract."' Parties who enter contracts under compulsion may be relieved
of their duties under that contract if it is shown that the elements of duress
were present at the time of contracting.5 '
The problem with duress is one of degree. When duress is claimed, a
court-must determine whether the compulsion was so serious and wrong-
ful that it should refuse to enforce the contract or, alternatively, undo the
contract. Some cases of duress are easy to recognize as outside the scope of
permissible conduct. 153  A classic case of duress requires a showing of (1)
a threat, (2) that is improper or wrongful, (3) that induces the party's mani-
festation of assent to the contract or the terms, and (4) that is considered
sufficiently grave to justify the fact that the "assenting" party gave in to the
threat and agreed to the coerced contract or term. s4
The courts have recognized that the classic doctrine of duress does not
always fit certain cases in the commercial world where deals have been
agreed to because of coercion by a party with stronger bargaining power.
To deal with. these types of issues, the courts developed the concept of
economic duress.'55 Economic duress looks at the business circumstances
contract).
149 See Weidman v. Tomaselli, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 688 (N.Y. Co. Ct.) (upholding an adhe-
sion contract for the lease of an apartment while striking a clause exacting attorney fees as
unconscionable), aff'd, 386 N.Y.S.zd 276 (N.Y. App. Term 1975).
150 See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P3d 979,987 (Cal. 2003) (identifying the justifica-
tions for eliminating unconscionable terms as opposed to voiding the whole contract).
151 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (I98i) (explaining compelled conduct
is not sufficient to manifest assent).
152 See Kaplan v. Keith, 377 N.E.2d 279, 28i (Ill. App. Ct. I978) (stating a contract en-
tered into under duress is voidable).
153 An example of behavior that clearly falls within the parameters of duress is where a
party makes a promise due to a threat of physical violence. See, e.g., United States v. McBride,
571 E Supp. 596, 61O-12 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (stating that a plea agreement offered by the gov-
ernment in exchange for information about the location of bombs that would save thousands
of lives and millions of dollars was made under duress), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1569 (5th Cir. 199o);
United States v. West, 607 E2d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that a promise of amnesty
made by prison officials in exchange for a promise not to harm hostages was induced by du-
ress).
154 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (identifying the necessary ele-
ments of duress that make a contract voidable).
155 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 977 F.2d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1992) (recogniz-
ing that economic duress exists where circumstances deprive a party of her free will and the
resulting contract is voidable).
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of the parties to the contract. When a party with superior bargaining power
coerces the other party into agreeing to a contract out of severe economic
necessity, the contract may be avoided if the economic realities were such
that it would effectively destroy the weaker party's business.1 6
Economic duress thus allows a party to a business transaction to
avoid certain agreements entered into because of business compulsion.'57
Although economic duress has been used most often to deal with cases
when one party has threatened to breach a contract if the other party does
not agree to a modification in a current contract, the equitable concept of
economic duress should apply also to initial contracts that have been forced
upon a party under economic compulsion. 5 For example, if a weaker party
agrees to a contract because the other contracting party will take action
that will destroy the weaker party's business, that contract may be avoided
under a theory of economic duress.
Additionally, a few courts have recognized that moral duress may exist
in certain cases. Moral duress has been explained as, "... imposition, op-
pression, under influence, or the taking of undue advantage of the business
or financial stress or extreme necessities or weakness of another; the theory
under which relief is granted being that the party profiting thereby has
received money, property, or other advantage, which in equity and good
conscience he ought not be permitted to retain."' 59
Not all threats will amount to duress.' 60 An improper threat occurs when
one party expresses a deliberate intent to cause a harm or loss to another.
The concept, however, is not fixed with specific characteristics, as it is a
matter of degree. Courts examine the factual scenarios on a case-by-case
basis deciding whether it is the type of threat that voids the contract.' 61 The
decision whether a statement is a threat or not may include a determination
whether the threat is the type that the law should allow or deter.'62 The
156 SeeAustin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp. 272 N.E.zd 533 (N.Y. 197i).
157 See Capps v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 453 P.2d 935, 938 (Or. 1969) (stating that a contract may
be unenforceable due to economic duress when undue advantage is taken of a person's eco-
nomic necessity).
158 See, e.g., Multimedia zooo, Inc. v. Attard, 374 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing
economic duress as a defense in Tennessee); VKK Corp. v. Nat'l. Football League, 244 E3d
I 14, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing economic duress as a defense under New York law); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal Prods. Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Mich. zooo) (recogniz-
ing the doctrine of economic duress as a way to avoid a contract).
159 Norton v. Mich. State Highway Dep't, 24 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Mich. i946) (quoting
Rees v. Schmits, 164 Ill. App. 250, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. i9Il)).
16o See Dunbar v. Dunbar, 429 P.zd 949, 953 (Ariz. 1967) (holding a threat to utilize the
courts to enforce a perceived right does not constitute duress).
161 See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 Ezd 753, 757 (2d Cir. 1967)
(explaining that a finding of duress is dependant upon the threatened person's state of mind
and is a question of degree).
162 See Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 E2d 924, 927 (7 th Cir. 1983) (stating
that the fundamental issue in determining whether a threat amounts to duress is whether the
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classic duress situation is one where a party enters into a contract because
the other choices given to her or him are totally unacceptable and would
result in grievous loss.1
63
The second element of duress requires the court to consider the inten-
tion behind the threat. As with the first element of duress, this second re-
quirement is also fluid and dependent on the specific facts of the individual
case. Obviously, a threat of physical harm is improper. 1"4 The doctrine of
duress, however, encompasses threats that may be perfectly legal and still
be improper.' 6 This element requires the court to consider the disparity of
bargaining power between the parties and the resulting unfairness of the
agreement. 66 Thus, if the stronger party threatens a consequence for the
sole purpose of gaining the other party's assent and it is a consequence that
the court determines is unfair'67 or against public policy,168 it may be held
to be wrongful.' 69 The court will look at the threat in conjunction with the
facts surrounding the exchange. Is the party with the stronger bargaining
power requiring agreement to a term that is unacceptable and only being
agreed to because of the potential consequences of not reaching an agree-
statement that induced the promise is the kind we want to discourage).
163 It is not uncommon to issue a threat during contract negotiations, such as telling the
other party that it is your last offer and if they do not agree to the contract you will withdraw
it and look for another business partner. Hard bargaining alone is generally not contracting
under duress. See DuFort v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 818 E Supp. 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stat-
ing that mere hard bargaining and the press of financial circumstances is not sufficient to
constitute duress).
164 No court would enforce a contract if it were induced by a threat to cause death or
serious bodily harm. Thus, a contract signed because a gun was held to a party's head would
clearly be avoidable under a theory of duress. See United States v. Bell, 855 F. Supp. 239, 241
(N.D. II1. 1994) (stating that duress is a valid defense where a party fears immediate death or
severe bodily injury).
165 See Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F3d 1320, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that
precedent has eliminated the requirement of an illegal threat and that even actions by the
government that are lawful may still support a claim of duress, if those actions violate the
concept of fair dealing).
166 An ordinary offer to make a contract often involves an implied threat by a party with
stronger bargaining power not to make a contract unless the terms are accepted. The critical
factor is often the fairness of the exchange as well as the disparity of bargaining power. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmts. a, f (1981).
167 See Noble v. White, 783 A.2d 1145, 1149-50 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (noting that one
factor in proving duress is whether the resulting transaction was unfair to the victim).
I68 A threat of criminal prosecution that induces a contract is often said to be made un-
der duress and against public policy. See e.g., Meech v. Lee, 46 N.W. 383 (Mich. 1890) (holding
that a mother who mortgaged her home to save her son from threatened criminal prosecu-
tion could avoid the mortgage because it was signed under duress and against public policy);
Ingalls v. Neidlinger, 216 P.2d 387, 391 (Ariz. 1950) (holding that under the modern rule of
duress a threat of criminal prosecution may invalidate a contract even if the victim of duress
is guilty of criminal wrongdoing).
169 See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
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ment? For example, if the stronger party requires a term that waives the
attorney-client privilege, although the ethical rules would normally sup-
port the privilege, is that a threat that is wrongful? Although it is not easy to
determine what exactly the proper limits are in bargaining, this article sug-
gests that the government has clearly gone beyond the acceptable limits in
three different situations.
Next, the court must consider whether the threat was the actual cause
of the weaker party's agreement to the offending terms. 70 Are there other
legitimate reasons why the weaker party might agree to these terms? As
long as the threat caused the apparent assent to the agreement, this ele-
ment is satisfied.
Finally, the court must consider the gravity of the threat. 1 ' How severe
does the threat need to be before it will justify a party's succumbing to the
will of another party? This element has caused some difficulty at times
because some courts have defined the severity of the threat in terms of
whether it overcomes the free will of the assenting party.' This element
cannot really be considered unless the court looks at it in the context where
it happened. Obviously, the threat to sue a party who has injured you by
running a red light and causing you thousands of dollars in significant mon-
etary damages sounds very severe. If, however, there is a reasonable alter-
native to choose, the threat is not severe enough to qualify for the defense
of duress. 173 Instead, the weaker party may choose to go to court and assert
her rights there.
Though some courts have referred to contracts entered into under du-
ress as "void" contracts, that term is actually improper because a void con-
tract may never be enforced. If a party agrees to a contract while under
duress, the usual remedy is to declare the contract voidable at the option
of the victim.'74 If, however, the victim ratifies the contract after the threat
has ceased, he or she loses the power to avoid the contract.'75 Additionally,
170 See N. Star Steel Co. v. United States, 477 E3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting
that duress requires a consideration of whether the threat and coercive acts actually caused
assent to the agreement).
171 See Wurtz v. Fleischman, 278 N.W.zd 266, 269 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that one
criteria to consider when determining whether duress exists is the gravity of the threatened
evil), rev'don other grounds, 293 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 198o).
172 See Capps v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 453 P.2d 935, 938 (Or. 1969) (noting that the Restatement
Second of Contracts defines duress as a situation that precludes a party from exercising free will
and judgment).
173 See Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.zd 484, 492
(S.D. 2001) (holding that economic duress requires a party to show that there was no reason-
able alternative but to agree to the other party's demands).
174 See U.S. for the Use of the Trane Co. v. Bond, 586 A.2d 734, 735 (Md. 1991) (discuss-
ing the difference between void and voidable contracts entered into under duress).
175 See Tidwell v. Critz, 282 S.E.2d 104, io8 (Ga. 1981) (noting that when a party ratifies
a contract, he or she may no longer assert duress and disaffirm a contract).
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a party desiring to avoid a contract using the defense of duress must seek
avoidance quickly after the threat of duress has been removed. 7 6 Duress
may be used affirmatively as a sword or defensively as a shield. Thus, a
victim may sue to have the offending contract declared unenforceable due
to the duress or he or she may use duress as a defense if the other party at-
tempts to enforce the contract in court.
Once a court determines that a contract has been entered into under
duress, it may order the contract avoided and, where appropriate, may re-
quire either party to pay restitution, so that everyone is returned to the
status quo.' The usual remedy for agreements entered into under duress
is to compel the victim to choose between affirming the entire contract or
total avoidance. 7  Once the duress is removed and the contract rescinded,
a party is free to enter into another contract that is fair with the offending
party.
2. Unconsionability.-The next doctrine that may be useful in determin-
ing whether deferred prosecution agreements or specific terms in these
agreements can withstand scrutiny is the doctrine of unconscionability.
An inquiry into whether a contract or any term of a contract is unconscio-
nable requires the court to consider first whether the contract is a result
of free bargaining. If a contract is not the result of true bargaining and the
stronger party essentially dictates the terms, the resulting contract is one
of adhesion. 17 9 Because adhesion contracts are economically useful,8 0 the
mere fact that a contract is one of adhesion will not mean that a contract
is unconscionable per se. Contracts of adhesion, however, require a court
to scrutinize the contract more carefully for fairness issues than one that is
the result of bargaining and dickered terms.'' Adhesion contracts are often
found to be fair if the goods or services that are the subject matter of the
176 SeeWeisert v. Bramman, 216 S.W.zd 430, 435 (Mo. 1948) (holding that a parry who is
attempting to avoid a contract because of duress must seek to repudiate the contract promptly
after the threat of duress is removed).
177 See Millheiser v. Wallace, 21 P.3d 752, 756 (Wyo. 2oo1) (noting that a party who has
avoided a contract may recover restitution for any benefit given to the other party and that the
court has discretion to return the parties to the status quo).
178 See T.A.C. v. J.R.C., No. CKoz-o3171, 2003 WL 23269498, at *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov.
21, 2003) (noting that a victim of duress normally must disaffirm the entire contract).
179 See Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics Mach., 657 N.W.2d 411,423 (Wis. 2003) (defining
a contract of adhesion as one "in which a party has, in effect, no choice to accept the contract
offered, often where the buyer does not have the opportunity to do comparative shopping or
the organization offering the contract has little or no competition").
i8o See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.zd 165, 171 (Cal. 1981) (discussing the history
of adhesion contracts and the fact that they provide many advantages that must be balanced
with the possibility of oppression by the party with superior bargaining power).
181 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 6oo-oi (1991) (explaining ad-
hesion contracts must be examined to determine their reasonableness).
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contract may be purchased elsewhere,' although some courts have found
that by definition an adhesion contract is procedurally unconscionable.'83
One of the most troubling features of unconscionability is that there is
no clear definition of the concept. Neither the Uniform Commercial Code"8
nor the Restatement of Contracts'85 offers sufficient guidance for courts to
use when determining whether an offending contract is unconscionable.
Instead, it is left to the judge to hear all of the evidence and decide wheth-
er one party truly took unfair advantage of the other party in the contract-
ing process. The closest a court has come to a definition is in the cel-
ebrated case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.' 86 where the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia declared, "[u]nconscionability has
generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea-
sonably favorable to the other party."' 87
This has led courts to use a two-part analysis in determining the ap-
plicability of the doctrine of unconscionability' 8 l Although a few courts
have held that a single term may be so unconscionable as to infect an en-
tire contract, 189 most courts agree that before a court strikes down a term
or an entire contract for unconscionability, it must find both procedural un-
conscionability' 9 and substantive unconscionability 9i Although often the
contracts that are declared unconscionable are consumer contracts, it does
not follow that only consumers may use the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity to escape an oppressive contract or an oppressive term in the contract.
Contracts outside of the consumer area have been declared unconsciona-
182 See Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 50 F. Supp. 2d 733, 739 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (noting that an
unconscionable adhesion contract is one where the terms are one-sided, there is a disparity of
bargaining power, and the services or products cannot be obtained elsewhere), aff'd, 228 E3d
709 (6th Cir. 2000).
183 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 E3 d I 126, 1148-49(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a contract
of adhesion is procedurally unconscionable).
184 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003).
185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
186 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
187 Id. at 449.
188 See, e.g., Jones Distrib. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1445, 146o (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (noting that before a court finds a contract or term unconscionable, it must find
both procedural and substantive unconscionability).
189 See e.g., Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. Ct. App. 198o) (find-
ing that a term in the contract that limited damages for defective goods was unconscionable
even though both parties were commercially experienced business people who had equal
bargaining power).
19o See Jones Distnb. Co., 943 E Supp. at 146o (defining procedural unconscionability
as one where the individualized circumstances show a great disparity of bargaining power
between the parties such that true assent is not possible).




First, in determining whether there is procedural unconscionability,
courts look at the process the parties used when they entered into the con-
tract. There is often a disparity of bargaining power between contracting
parties, but the existence of a mere disparity of bargaining power is insuf-
ficient for a finding of procedural unconscionability. 193 Courts, however,
have followed the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and recognized that a
gross inequality of bargaining power may satisfy this requirement. 194
Typically, when deciding whether procedural unconscionability exists,
the inquiry requires examining the degree of compulsion being exerted,
how much pressure was brought to bear on the less powerful party, and the
process that led to the agreement. 95 Although there is no definition of un-
conscionability, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists factors in the com-
ments that may be helpful to a court in determining whether procedural
unconscionability exists.196 They include: where the party in a superior
bargaining position does not believe there is a reasonable probability that
the other party will perform the contract; where the more powerful party
knows that the other party will not be able to receive a substantial benefit
from the contract, or knowledge by the stronger party that the other party is
192 See, e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3 d 1257 (9th Cir. 2oo6) (holding an
arbitration clause in a franchise agreement to be unenforceable because it was unconscio-
nable); Rozeboom v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1984) (holding that a contract
between an individual business person and a monopoly that contained a limitation of liability
term was so unfair that it was against public policy and unconscionable); Pittsfield Weaving
Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430 A.2d 638 (N.H. 1981) (holding that a contract between a com-
mercial weaving corporation and a corporation in the business of texturizing and selling yarn
was unconscionable due to a disparity of bargaining power and an oppressive term that ef-
fectively prevented the buyer from obtaining damages for defective yarn); Ashland Oil, Inc.
v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that a commercial contract between a les-
see and an oil company was unconscionable without regard to whether there was a disparity
of bargaining power between the parties, since there is always some disparity of bargaining
power in commercial contracts); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973) (holding
that a clause in a contract that gave the oil company an absolute right to terminate the contract
was so unconscionable and unfair that it was void as against public policy); Campbell Soup Co.
v. Wentz, 172 E2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (holding that a provision in a commercial contract between
a farmer and a soup company that had many onerous provisions in it, including a clause that
forbid the farmer from selling his goods even though the soup company could not accept
them, was unconscionable and "carrying a good joke too far").
193 See Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 ESupp. 689, 695 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (noting that the
purpose of the doctrine of unconscionability is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise and
not to disturb risk allocations because of superior bargaining power).
194 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 E3d sf26, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a gross
disparity of bargaining power will satisfy the requirement of procedural unconscionability);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
195 See, e.g., Jones Distnib. Co., 943 F. Supp. at 146o (noting that before a court can find pro-
cedural unconscionability it must review the specific facts of the case to determine whether
there is unfair bargaining power between the parties).
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (i981).
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unable to reasonably protect his or her interests. 97 Other factors that may
be important are the timing of the contract and the alternatives available to
the complaining party. 198
The second prong of the test requires a court to decide whether the
entire contract, or any term in the contract, is substantively unconscionable.
The court must review the terms of the contract to ascertain the fairness
of the agreement. 199 Obviously, this determination goes hand in hand with
the inquiry into whether procedural unconscionability exists. The contract
terms may seem more unfair if the weaker party did not want to enter into
the contract but was pressured into doing so. When determining substan-
tive fairness, the court looks at the harshness of the terms and whether they
are so "one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances exist-
ing at the time of the contract.""° A few decisions have held that a term
in a contract was so unfair substantively that it did not need to proceed to
a finding of procedural unconscionability before invalidating terms of the
contract. 01
The Uniform Commercial Code requires a court to give the parties an op-
portunity to be heard and present evidence before ruling on the issue of
unconscionability 02 After a court determines the contract or a term in the
contract is unconscionable, it has wide leeway to fashion an appropriate
remedy. It may refuse to enforce the entire contract, it may strike the un-
conscionable term and enforce the remainder of the contract, or it may limit
the contract in any fair way that will avoid an unconscionable result.20 3 This
allows the court to reform the contract in a way that makes the agreement
enforceable.2 04 Obviously, this gives a judge enormous flexibility when
197 Id.
198 See, e.g., Ting, 319 F2d at 1148-49 (holding that even where a party has an option to
switch to a different competing company for their service, a contract may still be procedurally
unconscionable); Szetela v. Discover Bank, i18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(stating that where a customer only had the option of agreeing to an amendment in his bank
account agreement or close the account there was effectively no option and that satisfied the
requirement of procedural unconscionabiliy).
199 See Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (D. Ariz. 2oo6) (noting
that a determination of substantive unconscionability requires an analysis of the terms of the
contract as well as the fairness of the contract).
200 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003).
201 See e.g., AI-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2005) (not-
ing that the Washington Supreme Court has held that a finding of substantive unconscionabil-
icy alone is sufficient to support a claim of unconscionability); Brower v. Gateway zooo, Inc.,
676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that an arbitration clause was substantively
unconscionable and unenforceable even though the contract was not procedurally unconscio-
nable); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.ad 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that the price
for a refrigerator was so excessive that it made the contract unconscionable).
202 U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
203 Id. § 2-302(I).
2o4 See Langemeier v. Nat'l Oats Co., 775 F2d 975, 977-78 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming a
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fashioning a remedy to deal with an unconscionable term or contract 05
D. Differences When Contract Law is Applied
in the Criminal Law Context
Before applying contract policing principles to deferred prosecution agree-
ments, it is important to note one other very important difference in the
application of contract doctrine to agreements made in the criminal jus-
tice system. Even though courts have declared that contract doctrine ap-
plies to agreements between the government and the accused,"° they have
also made it abundantly clear that there are some exceptions to traditional
contract theory when applied in the criminal justice context. Most nota-
bly, courts do not apply contract law strictly when analyzing these agree-
ments. 07 They infuse constitutional considerations and fairness doctrines
as important components to the analysis of these agreements.
Historically, much of the development of contract doctrine has cen-
tered in the area of commercial law. This makes sense because commerce
needed contract doctrine to help establish rules and parameters for parties
operating in the ever-growing business arena. 08 Likewise, the criminal
justice system will not move forward without rules and boundaries for the
agreements made between the government and the accused. It is common
knowledge that the criminal justice system would grind to a halt if every
case were brought to trial. 09 This results in a proliferation of plea agree-
ments and other agreements such as deferred prosecutions that keep many
district court's holding that a contract was unconscionable and permitting damages for the
seller by enforcing the contract without the offensive term).
205 See Asifa Quraishi, Comment, From a Gasp to a Gamble: A Proposed Test for
Unconscionability, 25 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 187, 195-2o6 (1991) (discussing the development of
the concept of unconscionability under the UCC, the unrestricted judicial discretion allowed,
and the need for clearer standards).
2o6 See United States v. Aleman, z86 E3d 86,89-90 (2d Cit. 2002) (stressing prosecutorial
agreements are subject to the principles of contract law).
207 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 218 E3d 1092, 1095 (9 th Cir. 2000) (discussing the
differences in contract law applied among private individuals as compared to the government
contracting in the criminal justice system); United States v. Ready, 82 E3d. 551, 558-59 (2d
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that there are differences between contract law and contracts made in
the criminal justice system that require holding the government to a stricter standard than a
private contracting party); United States v. Garcia, 956 F.2d 41, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting
that the differences between private contracting parties and the government and a defendant,
along with the court's constitutional and supervisory concerns, require the court to not apply
the parol evidence rule in a strict manner).
zo8 See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewwllyn and the Merchant
Rules, IOO HARV. L. REv. 465, 466-91 (1987) (discussing the development of the Uniform
Commercial Code).
209 See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003).
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defendants out of the court system or require less court time on resolving
the criminal matter. Without these agreements, the criminal justice system
could not function. °10 This does not, however, negate the fact that courts
have to develop rules and parameters for enforcing these agreements.
Contracting parties in the criminal justice system are held to a different
standard than those in the commercial law field. Contract doctrine governs
how private individuals contract with each other, although private parties
are given significant freedom to structure contracts. " ' When contract law
meets the criminal justice system one critical fact changes. The parties are
no longer private individuals exchanging promises for the benefit of each
other; replacing one of the parties is now the government, a party with
enormous power. This changes the stakes dramatically. Courts recognize
that when one of the contracting parties is the government, the typical
contract rules that are used in the commercial area should not be applied
exactly the same."'2 Overriding concerns must be factored into the equa-
tion when applying contract doctrine to agreements made in the criminal
justice system.2 1 3 These concerns shift the rules to favor the accused who
enters into an agreement with the government.
14
Defendants have constitutionally mandated rights"l' that may not be
ignored in the judicial process. Because the Constitution places limitations
on the prosecution in a criminal case and gives a defendant certain funda-
210 See Cambridge v. Duckworth, 859 Ezd 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that the
sheer volume of criminal trials would overload the criminal justice system if it did not use
plea bargaining).
211 See Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R. Eq. 462
(Chancery Ct.) (stating individuals should have full liberty to contract and that their contracts
should be honored by the courts).
212 A similar discussion occurs in the government contracting area when the government
is a party to a contract with private individuals. See generally W. Stanfield Johnson, Mixed Nuts
and Other Humdrum Disputes: Holding the Government Accountable Under the Law of Contracts
Between Private Individuals, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 677 (2003) (discussing whether the govern-
ment is being held to the rules of contract law that govern private parties); James A. Harley,
Economic Duress and Unconscionability: How Fair Must the Government Be?, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J.
76, 148-5o (1988) (discussing using private contract law to hold the government accountable
when a party alleges economic duress and unconscionability when contracting with the gov-
ernment).
213 See United States v. Riera, 298 E3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2002) (asserting courts must
consider the government's overwhelming advantage in bargaining power when examining
plea agreements).
214 This rule appears similar to how the Rule of Lenity is used in the criminal justice
process. The Rule of Lenity, "[ulnique to criminal law, is the statutory maxim that criminal
statutes should be interpreted narrowly in order to ensure that a defendant is not convicted
for a crime about which the person may have been unaware." ELLEN S. PODGOR, PETER J.
HENNING, ANDREW E. TASLITZ, & ALFREDO GARCIA, CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE
65 (zoo5).
215 See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) (noting that it is the guilty plea, not
the plea bargain, that merits constitutional protection).
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mental rights, the law of contract, which may seem harsh at times when ap-
plied to private contracting individuals, 16 is tempered. These underlying
Constitutional limitations do not have a direct corollary in the commercial
world. Private individuals have more latitude to enter into contracts, irre-
spective of whether those contracts represent poor negotiations. In contrast,
the accused in a criminal case is given certain protections under contract
law."l7 Thus, when courts rule on the formation and enforceability of these
criminal-related contracts, they are obliged to consider the agreements
more critically than they would if they were simply determining the rights
of private individuals who enter into a contract for their own benefit.
Courts also use their supervisory power to address the fairness of agree-
ments between the government and the accused. The Court in Santobello
stated, "all of these considerations presuppose fairness in securing agree-
ment between an accused and a prosecutor." '18 The cases are replete with
concern beyond protecting strict constitutional rights "to concerns for the
honor of the government, public confidence in the fair administration of
justice, and the effective administration of justice in a federal scheme of
government." '19 The courts' demands for utmost fairness by the prosecu-
tion are very relevant to the issues of policing agreements in the criminal
justice system. Due to this supervisory concern for fairness, courts have
held the government to a greater degree of responsibility than they would
have if they were individuals entering into private contracts.2 0
For example, private individuals often have contract disputes once per-
formance of the contract has begun. If the private parties litigate the dis-
pute, a court will apply general rules of contract doctrine when settling the
disagreement. One common contract maxim is that parties represented
by counsel bargain at arms length and thus are held strictly to their agree-
ments.2  If a loophole exists to the benefit of one party and not another,
that party may use it to his or her own advantage.2 2 Contrast that scenario
2 i6 See United States v. Garcia, 956 E2d 41,44 (4th Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply the parol
evidence rule in a strict manner because it would lead to an inequitable result).
217 See United States v. Clark, 55 E 3 d 9, 12 (ist Cir. 1995) (explaining courts hold the
government to the highest standards of promise and performance because plea agreements
require defendants to relinquish primary constitutional rights).
218 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
219 United States v. Ready, 8z E3d 551, 558 (2d Cit. 1996) (quoting United States v.
Harvey, 791 Ed 294, 300 (4 th Cir. 1986)).
220 See Garcia, 956 F.2d at 44 (stating that although the private law of contracts may be
appropriately applied in some cases, other matters, such as a court's supervisory concern, re-
quire holding the government to a greater degree of responsibility than a defendant).
221 See G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts:
Towarda New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 232, 236-38 (1991) (discussing opportunis-
tic behavior during the bargaining process and arguing for a change in the maxim).
222 See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 Fzd 588, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1991) (dis-
cussing that the law often contemplates that a parry to a contract may take advantage of the
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with a situation where a prosecutor tries to use the same contract doctrine
to the government's advantage. The courts will not permit the government
such leeway when it would cause an inequitable result."2 3 Thus, prosecu-
tors have been foiled when they have tried to take advantage of the parol
evidence rule to keep promises out of written agreements, 2 4 to use impre-
cise language to the government's advantage,2 2 5 to use narrow interpreta-
tion principles to change the government's obligations as to further pros-
ecutions of the defendant,2 6 and to use other rules of interpretation to get
to what appears to be an inequitable result.2 7
One reason for scrutinizing the government's behavior and its agree-
ments is that courts are cognizant of the fact that government attorneys
wield far superior bargaining power than the individual or corporation who
is accused of criminal conduct.2 8 As one court noted, "[s]ometimes gen-
eral fairness principles will require us to invalidate particular agreement
terms."22 9 This vastly differs from how courts resolve issues concerning
private contractual agreements. 30
III. CONTRACT LAW MEETS DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
When examining deferred prosecution agreements through the lens of
contract law one finds differences unique to the criminal justice system.
Although there may be many questionable provisions in various deferred
prosecution agreements, the three selected here are particularly egregious.
The doctrines of duress and unconscionability raise serious concerns as to
ignorance of a contracting partner without incurring liability).
223 See Garcia, 956 F.2d at 44 (stating "the inequity of the result below illustrates why
courts ought not rigidly apply commercial contract law to all disputes concerning plea agree-
ments. The government does not dispute that it made the promise-it just wants to take
advantage of a rule of contract law to profit from an omission in a contract it prepared. We
cannot countenance such unfair dealing").
224 Id.
225 See United States v. Bowler, 585 Fzd 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that a plea
agreement is not the appropriate place for the government to resort to a rigidly literal ap-
proach in the language of the plea agreement).
'2z6 See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294,300-03 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that the law
of commercial contracts has to be applied differently when the government is involved so that
the plea agreement in the instant case was interpreted narrowly to prevent further prosecu-
tions of the defendant).
227 See United States v. Clark, 218 F 3 d 1092, IO95 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that if an am-
biguity is found when interpreting a plea agreement, the government will normally bear the
responsibility for it).
228 See United States v. Aleman, 286 E3 d 86, 90 (2d Cit. 2002) (recognizing the superior
bargaining power of the government).
229 Id.
230 See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 E2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 199I) (stating that
contract law is not intended to make every party to a contract his brother's keeper).
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the viability of these three provisions. This is particularly true in light of
the fact that courts examine contracts in the criminal justice system much
more closely than an agreement between two private individuals.2 3'
Corporations have a strong incentive to enter into agreements that
waive the attorney- client privilege and waive the right to have a judicial
determination of whether there is a breach of contract. The government
power also forces them to breach a duty to pay previously negotiated at-
torney fees of corporate employees being accused by the government of
possible crime. 32 Despite the reversal of the Arthur Andersen, LLP case,
the destruction of the company provides a compelling motivation to other
corporations to agree to whatever terms are requested by the government.
Being successful in the judicial system may not save the corporation from
the reality of the ruin of the corporate entity caused by merely being in-
dicted by the government. Even those companies that do not face the loss
of clients due to their professional role, and those that are not subject to
exclusion or debarment, face potentially crippling civil actions. 33
These agreements are made under duress. There is the threat of gov-
ernment indictment and resulting destruction of the entire business that
induces the manifestation of assent to the deferred prosecution agreement.
But for the threat of possible prosecution by the government and its result-
ing consequences, these terms would not normally be agreed to by the
corporation.'-' In fact, normally there would be no incentive for a corpo-
ration to willingly agree to these terms. Without doubt, the threat is seri-
ous and sufficiently grave in that the possible manifestations of a failure to
agree and the destruction or loss of business, are overwhelming. Should a
company not sign the agreement with the government, it opens itself up
to potential derivative actions by shareholders. Outsiders may also find a
basis for a civil action, or use this evidence in pending civil matters, to claim
that the company was not acting responsibly. The shaming caused by the
publicity of this matter is a strong motivation for a company to agree to any
terms presented by the government. This can be especially true when the
company has a product sold on the open market. Other businesses may
also feel compelled to avoid association with the company out of fear of the
stigma caused by the government allegations. 35
Even though conduct by the government may be legal and with the
231 See supra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
232 Seesupra notes 95-I 16 and accompanying text.
233 See Cohen, supra note 3.
234 See United States v. Stein I, 435 E Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. zoo6) (noting that
the corporation would not have refused to pay attorney fees for its employees except that the
government "had the proverbial gun to its head").
235 Companies may also feel that if the government is proceeding against a company
that it is doing business with, they may become a part of the investigation and open them-
selves up to potential criminal or civil liability.
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beneficial motivation of stopping criminal conduct within the public, it is
improper and wrongful to force the corporation to agree to terms that they
would not accept under normal bargaining circumstances. Contract provi-
sions such as agreeing to abide by the law, placing internal monitors as
oversight, 36 and paying a fine for prior wrongdoing are legitimate provi-
sions, as these provisions are directly connected to the alleged wrongdoing
and will protect the public.2 37 In contrast, the waiving of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege raises ethical issues, has constitutional implications, and is
diametrically opposed to a basic tenet in the evidentiary structure of our
legal system. The removal of the judiciary from the decision whether there
has been a breach of contract also extends beyond the bounds of normal
contract terms because it removes the objective decision-maker from the
process. 38 Asking a corporation to sign an agreement that essentially in-
terferes 39 with the private contract rights between the corporation and its
employees, puts the corporation in the position of potentially being sued
by the corporate employee for breach of contract. Forcing a party to breach
a contract is improper and wrongful." 4
In addition to the elements of classic duress, these provisions should
be removed because they are agreed to under economic duress. The eco-
nomic reality is that if the corporation refuses to assent to the deferred
prosecution agreement, the result will likely be the death of the corpora-
tion or alternatively, severe financial repercussions that will gravely injure
the corporation. These consequences may result from an indictment eve-
236 See Agreement between United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division,
Fraud Section and InVision Technologies, Inc. 2, 4 (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.
corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/invisioni.pdf (agreeing that InVision will appoint a
monitor, and that the individual will be approved by the DOJ).
237 A deferred prosecution agreement that calls for a company to file amended tax re-
turns, as was seen in the non-prosecution agreement with Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., offers a
remedy that is directly tied to the wrongful conduct. See Press Release, Tommy Hilfiger Corp.,
Tommy Hilfiger Corporation Announces Resolution of U.S. Attorney's Office Investigation
(Aug. 10, 2005), available at http://investor.tommy.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=98332&p=irol-news-
Article& ID=742o85&highlight=.
238 See Allen v. Hadden, 57 F3d 1529, 1534 (ioth Cir. 1995) (describing the process for
determining a breach of contract such as a plea agreement as a question of law for the court
to decide).
239 See, e.g., Justin E. Myers, Sneaking Around the Corporate Veil: Tattooing a Parent
Corporation with Liability for Tortious Interference With its Subsidiary's Contract, 35 TEx. TECH. L.
REv. 193, 201-03 (2004) (discussing how a third party stranger, who is not a party to a contract,
may be liable for tortuous interference of contract when she or he intentionally causes a party
to a contract to breach); Wade Holt, Wal-Mart v. Sturges Tortious Interference With Prospective
Contractual Relations: Texas Officially Adopts the Modern Rule, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 537, 538-39
(2002) (discussing the development of the claim for tortious interference with contract).
240 In some instances, interfering with contract rights will bring liability in tort. See Gary
Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference
Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1107-20 (discussing liability for tortious interference with con-
tract).
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nif the corporation is later declared innocent.
Although there are both procedural and substantive aspects to uncon-
scionability, there are occasions when either the procedural or substantive
terms or processes are so egregious that they cause the contract or the terms
within the contract to fail. Both types of unconscionability exist in de-
ferred prosecution agreements, but even without a finding of procedural
and substantive unconscionability, courts may find that the government
entering into certain deferred prosecution agreements is inherently unfair.
Courts may use supervisory powers to quash these agreements. 
41
The procedural deficiencies are apparent when one looks at the gross
disparity in bargaining power of the parties. The power of the government
is massive in comparison to the corporation's need to avoid publicity, stigma
of an investigation, shareholder lawsuits, or a possible death sentence for
the corporate entity. This unequal bargaining position of the parties is a far
cry from what is seen in the normal circumstances between private parties
who enter into contracts at arms length.1
41
The specific terms within the contract also evidence substantive uncon-
scionability. A term, such as waiving the attorney-client privilege, is offen-
sive because it goes against fundamental tenets of the adversary system of
justice in the United States. Asking for this waiver is diametrically opposed
to ethical considerations within the legal profession. 43 So too, allowing one
party to have the sole determination as to whether there was a breach of
contract also is substantively unconscionable as it removes the legal system
24I As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, in interpreting plea agreements,
courts have necessarily drawn on the most relevant body of developed
rules and principles of private law, those pertaining to the formation and
interpretation of commercial contracts. But the courts have recognized
that those rules have to be applied to plea agreements with two things
in mind which may require their tempering in particular cases. First,
the defendant's underlying "contract" right is constitutionally based and
therefore reflects concerns that differ fundamentally from and run wider
than those of commercial contract law. Second, with respect to federal
prosecutions, the courts' concerns run even wider than protection of the
defendant's individual constitutional rights-to concerns for the honor
of the government, public confidence in the fair administration of jus-
tice, and the effective administration of justice in a federal scheme of
government."
United States v. Ready, 82 F3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Harvey, 791
Ed 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986)).
242 Because procedural unconscionability focuses on how a contract is presented to a
party, the sophistication of a party or the fact that a party is represented by counsel will not
necessarily defeat a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.,
469 E3d 1257, 128 3 -8 4 (9th Cir. 2oo6) (discussing the meaning of procedural unconscionabil-
ity and that just because a party is sophisticated or represented by an attorney does not mean
that procedural unconscionability is non-existent).
243 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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from the enforcement phase of the contract process. One can hardly call
it a fair bargain when one party is left to the whim of the opposing party
to determine the basis, the existence, and the punishment for a breach.
Likewise, allowing the government to provide a benefit to a corporation for
breaching a pre-existing contract is especially unfair to the contract rights
of the third parties who suffer from this government interference. This can
result in litigation against the corporation for the breach of contract.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors have enormous discretion in the charging process." They also
have discretion in deciding whether or not to proceed once a case has been
filed. 4 This discretion, however, has not applied to contractual agreements
entered into between the prosecution and defense. 46 For example, in the
plea bargain context the court plays a role in reviewing the contents of the
agreement. 47 This article maintains that courts need to take a similar role
in the deferred prosecution context.
Deferred and non-prosecution agreements serve an important role in
securing corporate compliance, 4 " avoiding costly trials, and protecting in-
nocent parties from corporate malfeasance. Despite the benefits here, it
is important that the terms in these agreements pass contractual muster.
Courts are reluctant to avoid contracts merely because a single or a few
terms within the agreements are entered into under duress or are proce-
durally or substantively unconscionable. The more appropriate remedy
is to reform the contract by deleting the egregious terms to effectuate the
contractual agreement. That can be done here.
Courts need to scrutinize these deferred and non-prosecution agree-
ments to ascertain which terms are improper. Eliminating the offending
terms would allow the contracts to continue for the benefit of the gov-
ernment, the corporations, associated parties, and public. To coin an old
z44 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (holding that prosecutors
have broad discretion in deciding whom to prosecute); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S.
368, 380 (i982) (permitting prosecutor to forgo legitimate charges in an effort to save time
and money).
245 See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 32 (1977) (holding it to be an abuse of
discretion for a court not to accept the prosecutor's motion to dismiss a case that violated the
Petite policy); United States v. Cowan, 524 E2d 504,513 (5 th Cir. 1975) (holding that prosecu-
tors have total discretion in initiating and terminating a prosecution).
246 See supra notes 12 1-25 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 21 1-27 and accompanying text.
248 See generally Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of
Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the
District of New Jersey and Bristol -Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043 (2OO6) (discussing
the benefits of the deferred prosecution agreement in the Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. case).
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adage, the courts do not have to throw out the baby with the bathwater149
249 This idiomatic phrase means that "[iun getting rid of waste, don't also discard what is
worth keeping." E.D. HIRSCH, JR., JOSEPH F. KETT & JAMES TREFIL, THE NEW DICTIONARY OF
CULTURAL LITERACY (3d ed. zooz), available at http://www.bartleby.com/59/3 / dontthrowout.
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